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🚨 [security] Update vite 2.9.9 → 2.9.17 (patch)

Depfu Bot requested to merge depfu/update/yarn/vite-2.9.17 into main

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ vite (2.9.9 → 2.9.17) · Repo · Changelog
Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Vite dev server option `server.fs.deny` can be bypassed when hosted on case-insensitive filesystem

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, vite@2.9.17

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

  1. Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
  2. Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem
  3. Populated vite.config.js with
export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction

  1. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//
    • Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root
  2. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
    • Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
  3. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
    • Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof
Screenshot 2024-01-19 022736

Impact

Who

  • Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

  • Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

🚨 Vite Server Options (server.fs.deny) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//)

Summary

Vite Server Options (server.fs.deny) can be bypassed using double forward-slash (//) allows any unauthenticated user to read file from the Vite root-path of the application including the default fs.deny settings (['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}'])

Impact

Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected, and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.

Patches

Fixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5
And in the latest minors of the previous two majors: vite@3.2.7, vite@2.9.16

Details

Vite serve the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, vite using server options fs.deny to protected the sensitive information of the file. But, with simply double forward-slash, we can bypass this fs restriction.

PoC

  1. Create a new latest project of vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates for tested and pnpm)
  2. Serve the application on dev mode using pnpm run dev.
  3. Directly access the file from url using double forward-slash (//) (e.g: //.env, //.env.local)
  4. Server Options fs.deny restrict successfully bypassed.

Proof Images:
proof-1
proof-2

🚨 Vitejs Vite before v2.9.13 vulnerable to directory traversal via crafted URL to victim's service

Vitejs Vite before v2.9.13 was discovered to allow attackers to perform a directory traversal via a crafted URL to the victim's service.

Release Notes

2.9.17

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

2.9.16

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

2.9.15

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

2.9.14

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

2.9.13

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

2.9.12

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

2.9.11

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

2.9.10

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

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