Observation slash accounting is split by finality: final-first observations retain `+1`, and instant-final outbound signers receive `+2` at non-final consensus
# Summary
Observation slash accounting treats final and non-final observations of the same external transaction as separate credit tiers. This creates two permanent-penalty paths for honest observations:
1. **Final consensus arrives before a delayed non-final observation (confirmed on BSC inbound and outbound).** The delayed non-final observation is charged `+1 ObserveSlashPoints`, but it cannot receive either refund:
- the late-observer refund requires the observation to have the same finality as the stored final consensus transaction; and
- the non-final consensus/refund path is permanently disabled after `voter.FinalisedHeight` is set.
2. **The signing committee's instant outbound observation is final, while the scanner's first observation is non-final (confirmed on LTC and DOGE).** Bifrost submits the pre-broadcast instant observation with `ConfirmationRequired: 0`, so `BlockHeight == FinaliseHeight`. At scanner non-final consensus, Thornode excludes those instant-final signers when constructing the observer set. A committee member that has submitted the instant observation but has not yet submitted the scanner's non-final variant is therefore classified as a non-signer and receives `+2 LackOfObservationPenalty`. Later final consensus can refund the instant observation's `+1`, but it never reverses the earlier `+2`.
Both paths are finality-accounting failures. Transaction consensus should remain finality-sensitive; the problem is that slash credit and non-signer classification do not account safely for observations that cross finality tiers or arrive out of order.
## Version status: still present in the public 3.21.0 release
Verified against:
- tag [`v3.21.0`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/releases/v3.21.0), commit [`4fe4e93c`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/commit/4fe4e93ce02737daccd1b36255d36e83f953d74b);
- current public `mainnet` head [`909528f1`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/commit/909528f18d62dea894cddd7461d58f1b003371e7), titled `Release 3.21.0: defer Bifrost-only commits to parity release`.
The three relevant files are unchanged between those two revisions. The public 3.21.0 release notes say the deployed release will use a private binary containing additional security patches, so that unpublished code cannot be audited here. No fix for this issue appears in the public release code or changelog.
At the time of verification (2026-10-19), the public network endpoint still reported `current`, `next`, and `querier` as `3.20.3`; the 3.21.0 activation height in the release notes is `28366100`. The live voters below therefore demonstrate the production failure on 3.20.3, while source inspection confirms that the relevant logic remains in public 3.21.0.
## Impact observed on mainnet
Both accounting paths are present in mainnet voters and slash telemetry:
- BSC inbound and outbound observations show final consensus followed by matching non-final variants that cannot enter either remaining refund path.
- LTC and DOGE outbound observations show signing-time final variants alongside scanner non-final variants, exposing signing-committee members to `LackOfObservationPenalty` at non-final consensus despite a matching instant observation already being present in the voter.
This produces permanent `failed_observe_txin` and `failed_observe_txout` accrual without affecting transaction consensus or funds directly.
## Mainnet evidence
### A. BSC final consensus lands before the non-final observation
Representative inbound voter:
[`22A4D16B30B6417B9D45668BF311118D92281912087DC1072E2E4F46D5480188`](https://public-thornode.nativeswap.io/thorchain/tx/details/22A4D16B30B6417B9D45668BF311118D92281912087DC1072E2E4F46D5480188)
| Variant | External height | Finalise height | Signers |
|---------|----------------:|----------------:|--------:|
| Final | 128346440 | 128346440 | 111 |
| Non-final | 128346437 | 128346440 | 36 |
The transaction, gas, memo, coins, and observed vault are identical. The final variant reached consensus first. A matching non-final observation arriving afterward is charged `+1`, but the code paths described below leave it with no reachable refund.
Representative outbound voter:
[`A894FEC033329414E606937767220DBAF94EED9B692D0B04A14B61ED33B560B7`](https://public-thornode.nativeswap.io/thorchain/tx/details/A894FEC033329414E606937767220DBAF94EED9B692D0B04A14B61ED33B560B7)
| Scanner variant | External height | Finalise height | Gas | Signers |
|-----------------|----------------:|----------------:|----:|--------:|
| Final | 128344135 | 128344135 | 6947 | 111 |
| Non-final | 128344132 | 128344135 | 6947 | 22 |
Again, the non-final scanner variant differs only in observation/finality height. The voter also contains expected instant estimated-gas variants (`30000`); those are separate from this finality-ordering failure.
### B. LTC instant-final signer is penalized at scanner non-final consensus
Representative outbound voter:
[`08C3E96F84C85755E88EE48F2368F491DEE8B934502D3DEF4D71BAB52DA7E45A`](https://public-thornode.nativeswap.io/thorchain/tx/details/08C3E96F84C85755E88EE48F2368F491DEE8B934502D3DEF4D71BAB52DA7E45A)
| Variant | External height | Finalise height | Gas | Signers |
|---------|----------------:|----------------:|----:|--------:|
| Signer instant observation (final) | 3197544 | 3197544 | 67540 | 19 |
| Scanner observation (non-final) | 3197546 | 3197552 | 67540 | 92 |
| Scanner observation (final) | 3197552 | 3197552 | 67540 | 92 |
All three versions contain the same transaction, gas, memo, coins, and vault. The voter demonstrates the precise finality split: signing-time observers occupy the final tier while the scanner first establishes non-final consensus. Any instant signer absent from that scanner variant is classified as a non-signer and receives `+2`, even though its matching observation is already present in the voter. At later final consensus, the instant-final observation is eligible for the ordinary `+1` observe refund, but the prior non-final `+2` is not reversed.
## Root cause in v3.21.0
### 1. Every new variant is charged before credit is evaluated
Both inbound and outbound paths first apply `+ObserveSlashPoints` for each accepted observation:
- inbound: [`handler_observed_tx_helpers.go:51-54`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/handler_observed_tx_helpers.go#L51-54)
- outbound: [`handler_observed_tx_helpers.go:678-681`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/handler_observed_tx_helpers.go#L678-681)
That is safe only if every valid finality variant has a reachable refund path.
### 2. Redundant-observation refunds are explicitly partitioned by finality
`shouldRefundRedundantObservation` skips every prior observation whose `IsFinal()` value differs:
[`type_observed_tx.go:411-436`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/types/type_observed_tx.go#L411-436)
```go
for _, existing := range m.Txs {
// Final and non-final observations receive separate normal consensus
// credits, so they must also have separate redundant-refund allowances.
if existing.IsFinal() != tx.IsFinal() || !existing.HasSigned(signer) {
continue
}
// ...
}
```
Therefore an already-credited final observer receives no immediate redundant refund when its delayed non-final variant arrives.
### 3. Late-observer refunds also require identical finality
The finalized late branches require:
```go
voter.Tx.IsFinal() == tx.IsFinal()
```
- inbound: [`handler_observed_tx_helpers.go:118-127`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/handler_observed_tx_helpers.go#L118-127)
- outbound: [`handler_observed_tx_helpers.go:773-781`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/handler_observed_tx_helpers.go#L773-781)
A non-final observation arriving after final consensus cannot pass these branches.
### 4. Non-final consensus becomes unreachable after final consensus
The non-final consensus/refund paths are gated by `voter.FinalisedHeight == 0`:
- inbound: [`handler_observed_tx_helpers.go:130-163`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/handler_observed_tx_helpers.go#L130-163)
- outbound: [`handler_observed_tx_helpers.go:799-835`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/handler_observed_tx_helpers.go#L799-835)
Once final consensus wins the ordering race, later non-final observations can never obtain their normal consensus or late-observer credit.
### 5. Instant observations are forced into the final tier
The signer submits every automatic pre-broadcast observation with `ConfirmationRequired: 0`:
[`bifrost/signer/sign.go:1613-1622`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/bifrost/signer/sign.go#L1613-1622)
```go
s.observer.ObserveSigned(types.TxIn{
Chain: item.TxOutItem.Chain,
TxArray: []*types.TxInItem{obs},
MemPool: true,
Filtered: true,
ConfirmationRequired: 0,
// ...
})
```
`FinaliseHeight` is built as `BlockHeight + ConfirmationRequired`, and `ObservedTx.IsFinal()` is true when `FinaliseHeight == BlockHeight`. Thus every instant observation is final even on confirmation-counting chains where the scanner first reports the mined transaction as non-final.
### 6. Consensus observer credit and non-signer classification exclude the other finality tier
`getObserveSigners` filters the voter entries to the stored consensus transaction's finality before matching the underlying transaction:
[`type_observed_tx.go:284-312`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/types/type_observed_tx.go#L284-312)
```go
final := m.Tx.IsFinal()
for _, tx := range m.Txs {
if tx.IsFinal() != final {
continue
}
// ...
}
```
At non-final consensus, `GetOutboundObserveSigners()` therefore excludes the instant-final signing committee. The handler then computes `nonSigners` from that restricted set and applies `+LackOfObservationPenalty`:
[`handler_observed_tx_helpers.go:815-825`](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/thornode/-/blob/v3.21.0/x/thorchain/handler_observed_tx_helpers.go#L815-825)
## Why the existing instant-observation fix does not cover this
The gas/height instant-observation fix made slash credit gas-agnostic and added a bounded redundant-variant refund. It works when the instant and scanner observations occupy the **same finality tier**. The current issue survives because all of those credit paths retain explicit finality equality checks.
Accordingly, this is not a recurrence of the estimated-gas split or the height-only `HasSigned` bug. It is the remaining finality dimension of the same accounting problem.
## Expected behavior
- A valid delayed non-final observation must not retain `+1` merely because final consensus happened first.
- A committee member's matching instant outbound observation must prevent that member from being classified as a complete non-observer at scanner non-final consensus.
- Consensus selection and finality-sensitive transaction processing must remain unchanged.
- Each actual observation charge must be refunded at most once; a fix must not introduce a cross-tier double refund.
## Suggested fix shape
The two accounting operations should be separated:
1. **Final-first stale non-final variant:** after final consensus, if a signer already has final observation credit on `voter.Tx` and submits a matching non-final version within the flexibility window, refund only that new observation's `ObserveSlashPoints`. Do not apply another `LackOfObservationPenalty` refund, and do not reopen non-final consensus.
2. **Non-final consensus with instant-final observers:** retain the same-finality signer set for decrementing the non-final observations' `+1` charges, but compute the `nonSigners` penalty set from every matching outbound observation across finality tiers. This allows an instant-final committee observation to prevent a false `+2`, while its own `+1` remains associated with and refunded by the final tier. In other words, use distinct sets for:
- charges eligible for refund at this consensus; and
- nodes eligible to be called complete non-observers.
This is safer than simply removing every finality check from `getObserveSigners`, which could refund a signer twice when the normal non-final-then-final sequence occurs.
## Regression tests
At minimum, add handler-level tests for:
1. **Inbound final-first ordering**
- 3-of-4 nodes establish final consensus.
- One already-credited signer then submits the matching non-final variant within `ObservationDelayFlexibility`.
- Its ending slash balance equals its starting balance, not `start + 1`.
2. **Outbound final-first ordering**
- Same sequence as above for `processTxOutAttestation`.
- Use identical gas so the test isolates finality.
3. **Confirmation-counting outbound**
- One node submits a final instant observation.
- The other 3-of-4 nodes establish non-final scanner consensus for the same transaction.
- The instant signer does not receive `LackOfObservationPenalty`.
- Later final consensus refunds the instant observation's single `ObserveSlashPoints` charge exactly once.
4. **No cross-tier double refund**
- Exercise the ordinary non-final-then-final scanner sequence with a signer present in both variants.
- Confirm that the signer ends at its starting balance and cannot use the second tier to remove unrelated slash points.
## Severity
**Medium.** The bug does not affect transaction consensus or funds directly, but it creates systematic permanent slash accrual for validators that did submit a matching transaction observation, pollutes slash telemetry, and can influence churn/jail outcomes. Mainnet voters show both failure shapes occurring in production.
issue
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