There is an issue in a corner case of the rejection operation of TORU that basically makes it possible for an attacker to publish a message for which one cannot provide a “large enough” proof, and that can be used by the same attacker to publish a wrongful commitment that cannot be refuted. This is a deal breaker for the TORU feature as a whole, but it does not endanger the safety of the layer-1.
This simple fix addresses the issue.
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