net/checksum.c: net_checksum_calculate() ip_len underflow → ~64KB heap OOB read (incomplete fix of CVE-2016-2857)
## Host environment
- Operating system: Ubuntu 24.04 (container on macOS 27.0.1 host)
- OS/kernel version: `Linux 7.2.9-orbstack aarch64 #1 SMP PREEMPT` (`uname -a` in the container)
- Architecture: aarch64 host
- QEMU flavor: qemu-system-arm
- QEMU version: `QEMU emulator version 8.2.2 (Debian 1:8.2.2+ds-0ubuntu1.18)` (distro package). The vulnerable code is identical in the 11.1.2 release binary (homebrew, verified) and in current git master `net/checksum.c` (checked 2026-10-18): the flagged lines have been unchanged since the 2016 refactor of this function.
- QEMU command line (as emitted by the attached `run.sh`):
```
qemu-system-arm -M ast2500-evb -m 512M -nographic -nodefaults -serial null -monitor none \
-drive if=none,format=raw,file=flash.img,id=fmc0 \
-device mx66u51235f,bus=ssi.0,cs=0x0,drive=fmc0 \
-device loader,file=ftgmac.elf \
-netdev socket,id=n0,listen=127.0.0.1:15556 \
-net nic,model=ftgmac100,netdev=n0
```
## Emulated/Virtualized environment
- Operating system: none — bare-metal guest (a ~200-line ARMv5TE
test driver built from the attached source;
no OS image needed)
- Architecture: arm (Aspeed AST2500 BMC machine, ftgmac100 NIC)
## Description of problem
Integer underflow in `net_checksum_calculate()` (net/checksum.c) leads to a
~64 KB heap out-of-bounds READ in the QEMU process, reachable by a malicious
guest through emulated-NIC TX checksum offload (and by other untrusted-input
paths, see below).
```c
int mac_hdr_len, ip_len; /* line 62: SIGNED int */
...
ip_len = lduw_be_p(&ip->ip_len); /* attacker-supplied field */
if (length < ip_len) { /* upper bound ONLY */
return;
}
ip_len -= IP_HDR_GET_LEN(ip); /* 21 - 60 = -39 (IHL=15) */
...
if (ip_len < sizeof(tcp_header)) { /* int promoted to size_t:
(size_t)-39 is huge, so
this guard PASSES */
return;
}
csum = net_checksum_tcpudp(ip_len, ...); /* uint16_t parameter:
0xffd9 = 65497 */
```
`net_checksum_tcpudp()` → `net_checksum_add()` then reads 65497 bytes
starting at `ip + 1` out of a packet-sized heap buffer. In the attached
reproduction the buffer is the 96-byte `s->frame` array of FTGMAC100State,
and the 16-bit checksum fold of the out-of-bounds window is written into the
packet's `th_sum` and transmitted on the netdev — i.e. the OOB bytes are
observable on the wire (a 16-bit-per-query heap-content oracle), in addition
to the layout-dependent SIGSEGV/DoS.
`ip_len` and `IHL` are attacker-controlled in every caller family of
`net_checksum_calculate()`:
1. **Guest TX checksum offload** (attacker = the guest, same boundary as
CVE-2016-2857): hw/net/ftgmac100.c:611 (demonstrated, see below),
hw/net/imx_fec.c:472, hw/net/cadence_gem.c:1386, hw/net/npcm_gmac.c:612,
hw/net/allwinner-sun8i-emac.c:537, hw/net/fsl_etsec/rings.c:232,
hw/net/xen_nic.c:202.
2. **virtio-net RX** `work_around_broken_dhclient()`
(hw/net/virtio-net.c:1706): attacker = peer VM on vnet_hdr fabrics
(tap/vhost-user); one frame with `VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM`, IPv4,
proto UDP, `ip_len = 21`, IHL = 15 (the UDP source-port-67 check reads a
fixed offset 34, so it passes with the port bytes inside the fake
"options"), < 1500 bytes. Verified by source reading, not dynamically.
3. **filter-rewriter** (net/filter-rewriter.c:116,218): attacker = untrusted
netdev peer where a COLO filter is configured. Verified dynamically on
the 11.1.2 binary: under LLDB, hardware read watchpoints fired at the
first byte past the packet object and near the 64 KB window end; under
the system guard-malloc allocator the same single packet kills QEMU with
SIGSEGV, crash-report frames: `net_socket_send →
qemu_send_packet_async_with_flags → colo_rewriter_receive_iov →
net_checksum_calculate → net_checksum_tcpudp → net_checksum_add_cont`.
This is **not** a duplicate of CVE-2016-2857: the 2016 fix added only the
upper-bound check (`length < ip_len` / its era equivalent). The lower bound
(`ip_len` must cover at least the IP header itself) has never existed, in
either the old or the refactored code, and no public report of the underflow
direction was found in NVD / qemu-devel / GitLab issues (2016–2026).
Suggested fix (4 lines, before the subtraction):
```c
ip_len = lduw_be_p(&ip->ip_len);
/* Last, check that we have enough data for the all IP frame */
if (length < ip_len) {
return;
}
+ /* ip_len must cover at least the IP header itself */
+ if (ip_len < IP_HDR_GET_LEN(ip)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
ip_len -= IP_HDR_GET_LEN(ip);
```
## Steps to reproduce
1. Untar the attached `cve-poc-package.tar.gz` and `cd cve-poc-package`.
Requirements: Linux with `qemu-system-arm` (tested 8.2.2),
`gcc-arm-none-eabi` (arm-none-eabi-gcc + binutils) and `python3`.
2. Run `./run.sh`. It builds the bare-metal guest from source, boots
`-M ast2500-evb` with the onboard ftgmac100 on a socket netdev, and has
the guest transmit two 96-byte frames whose bytes are identical except
the IPv4 IHL nibble (0x45 vs 0x4F), both with TX checksum offload
requested via the descriptor's TXDES1_TCP_CHKSUM bit.
3. Observe the verdict printed by the capture side:
```
CTRL (IHL=5) th_sum = 0x0000 guard fires: ip_len-20 = 1 < 20
BUG (IHL=15) th_sum = 0xb364 in-frame-only sum would be 0x8acc
guard-fires-on-CTRL : PASS
guard-bypassed-on-BUG : PASS (nonzero th_sum written)
sum-uses-beyond-frame-bytes: PASS (differs from in-frame-only fold)
deterministic-across-shots : PASS
```
Interpretation: the IHL=5 control frame shows the `ip_len < sizeof(tcp_header)`
guard working as intended (checksum declined, th_sum left 0). The IHL=15 frame
is byte-identical apart from the header-length nibble, yet a checksum IS
computed — from a 65497-byte read of which only 62 bytes exist in the frame —
and its value differs from any in-frame-only fold, i.e. the transmitted
`th_sum` is the fold of out-of-frame heap memory. Exit code 0 on success.
**Tooling disclosure** (per the note below): this issue was found with
automated static analysis (an integer-overflow detector suite run on lifted
IR of the release binary, with SMT-based reachability gating). The reporter
then validated it end-to-end by hand: the reproduction above was executed
by the reporter on QEMU 8.2.2 (output shown), the same site was confirmed
under LLDB on the 11.1.2 binary, and the master source was checked by hand.
## Additional information
Attachment: `cve-poc-package.tar.gz` (7 KB, source-only: run.sh, capture.py,
start.S, vectors.S, main.c, ld.ld — no binaries; the guest is built from
auditable C source in a few seconds).
For completeness, the impact under stock allocators is honest-bounded: the
~64 KB read usually lands inside mapped heap (no crash); the reliable
observations are (a) the on-wire 16-bit heap-content oracle and (b) a
deterministic SIGSEGV under guard-page allocators (libgmalloc / ASAN builds)
at `net_checksum_add_cont`. No write primitive is claimed.
[qemu-ip_len-underflow-poc.tar.gz](/uploads/f83c47455f868bc12d7c357abd4d993d/qemu-ip_len-underflow-poc.tar.gz)
issue
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