DMG LZFSE short decode exposes stale host heap contents to a guest
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## Host environment
- Operating system:
Linux
- OS/kernel version:
Linux anonymous 6.8.0-146-generic #146-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Sep 3 16:12:30 UTC 2026 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
- Architecture:
x86_64
- QEMU flavor:
`qemu-system-x86_64` and `qemu-io`, with the DMG block driver and optional `LZFSE` support enabled
- QEMU version:
QEMU v11.1.2 Upstream commit: 4fc49f46dc95d4a27de2509e7fceb2931e91faeb
- QEMU command line:
```
qemu-system-x86_64 \
-machine q35,accel=kvm \
-kernel /path/to/bzImage \
-initrd initramfs.cpio.gz \
-append "console=ttyS0 rdinit=/init quiet" \
-nographic \
-qmp unix:/tmp/qemu-dmg-qmp.sock,server=on \
-device pcie-root-port,id=rp1
```
## Emulated/Virtualized environment
- Operating system:
Minimal Linux guest
- OS/kernel version:
Linux 7.0.0-14-generic
- Architecture:
x86_64
Machine type: `q35`
Primary accelerator: KVM
Guest storage transport: `virtio-blk-pci`
## Description of problem
The QEMU DMG block driver accepts any positive return value from `lzfse_decode_buffer()` as successful decompression. A crafted DMG can declare an output chunk larger than the valid LZFSE stream actually produces. QEMU allocates the declared output size in an uninitialized aligned heap buffer and then returns its unwritten tail as normal virtual disk sectors.
This allows an attacker-controlled DMG image to disclose stale QEMU heap data. Testing recovered password, API-token, and private-key markers from a previously closed, host-only DMG image. In the full end-to-end test, the victim node was never attached to the guest. The trusted host read and deleted that node, then a Linux guest recovered its contents from a newly hotplugged attacker disk through a normal `virtio-blk` device.
### Root cause
In `block/dmg-lzfse.c`, `dmg_uncompress_lzfse_do()` passes the declared output capacity to `lzfse_decode_buffer()` but accepts every positive decoded length:
```c
size_t out_size = lzfse_decode_buffer((uint8_t *) next_out, avail_out,
(uint8_t *) next_in, avail_in,
NULL);
if (out_size > 0) {
return out_size;
}
return -1;
```
The return value is the number of bytes actually written. A valid stream that produces one byte therefore succeeds when `avail_out` is 1 KiB or even 64 MiB.
The attacker-controlled sector count determines the size of `s->uncompressed_chunk` in `block/dmg.c`:
```c
s->uncompressed_chunk = qemu_try_blockalign(
bs->file->bs, 512 * ds.max_sectors_per_chunk);
```
This allocation is not initialized. The ULFO path calls the LZFSE helper but only rejects a negative result:
```c
ret = dmg_uncompress_lzfse((char *)s->compressed_chunk,
(unsigned int)s->lengths[chunk],
(char *)s->uncompressed_chunk,
(unsigned int)(512 * s->sectorcounts[chunk]));
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
```
Finally, `dmg_co_preadv()` copies every declared sector to the block caller:
```c
data = s->uncompressed_chunk + sector_offset_in_chunk * 512;
qemu_iovec_from_buf(qiov, i * 512, data, 512);
```
The bzip2 path already requires `total_out == avail_out`, and the zlib path similarly verifies the final decompressed size.
### Security impact
An attacker who can supply a DMG image and read its virtual sectors can receive stale bytes from the QEMU process. Depending on allocator history, the exposed data can include:
- sectors from a previously processed image;
- passwords, tokens, private keys, or other data stored in those sectors;
- QEMU PIE and host libc pointers that reveal their ASLR load bases; and
- allocator metadata.
The maximum permitted chunk size is 64 MiB. An 881-byte DMG containing a 13-byte LZFSE stream that produces one byte was accepted with a declared output size of 67,108,864 bytes. This leaves 67,108,863 bytes unwritten but observable through block reads.
The disclosed location is allocator-dependent rather than directly selectable. Useful disclosure requires allocation reuse. A fresh process that opens only the attacker image generally receives newly zero-filled pages.
The demonstrated cross-image sequence requires a management layer to replace block nodes without terminating QEMU. QMP is a privileged management interface and is not available to an ordinary guest. The malicious guest only performs the final read from the attacker-controlled disk. Deployments that terminate the QEMU process before replacing an image do not retain this heap history.
In the end-to-end reproducer, the guest starts with no block device and never receives the victim node. A privileged host-side monitor read primes the victim buffer. The first and only disk exposed to the guest is the attacker DMG.
Relevant deployment patterns include live block-device replacement, long-lived QEMU processes, and shared storage or image-processing services that handle multiple images in one process.
## Steps to reproduce
* Required files:
```text
reproduce-guest-e2e.py
initramfs.cpio.gz
victim-secrets-1024.dmg
attacker-short-1024.dmg
```
Download the four attachments into the same directory.
Requirements:
- an upstream QEMU v11.1.2 build with DMG and LZFSE support;
- `qemu-system-x86_64` from that build;
- KVM access on the host;
- an x86-64 Linux `bzImage` with built-in virtio-blk, PCI hotplug, and devtmpfs support; and
- Python 3 on the host.
Run:
```sh
python3 ./reproduce-guest-e2e.py \
--qemu-system /path/to/qemu-system-x86_64 \
--kernel /path/to/bzImage \
--lzfse-lib-dir /path/to/liblzfse/lib \
--accel kvm
```
The reproducer performs the following sequence without restarting QEMU:
1. QEMU boots the Linux guest with an empty PCIe root port and no block device.
2. The guest verifies that no `/sys/class/block/vd*` device exists, then prints `GUEST:READY_FOR_ATTACKER`.
3. QMP `blockdev-add` opens `victim-secrets-1024.dmg` as an unattached block node. It is never exposed through a guest device.
4. The trusted host invokes HMP `qemu-io` through QMP `human-monitor-command` and reads 1,024 bytes from the victim node. This fills the DMG decompression buffer with the synthetic credentials.
5. QMP `blockdev-del` closes the victim node and frees its buffer.
6. QMP `blockdev-add` opens `attacker-short-1024.dmg`, whose LZFSE stream produces only one byte, and `device_add` exposes this attacker node as the guest's first `virtio-blk` disk.
7. The guest reads the first attacker sector using `dd` and checks for the victim credential markers.
The combined host/guest log also contains boot messages and a sector hexdump. The decisive success markers on a vulnerable build are:
```text
GUEST:NO_INITIAL_BLOCK_DEVICE
GUEST:READY_FOR_ATTACKER
HOST:VICTIM_PRIMED_WITHOUT_GUEST_ATTACHMENT
HOST:VICTIM_NODE_DELETED
GUEST:ATTACKER_ATTACHED=/dev/vda
GUEST:RECOVERED_DB_PASSWORD
GUEST:RECOVERED_API_TOKEN
GUEST:RECOVERED_PRIVATE_KEY
GUEST:E2E_CREDENTIAL_RECOVERY_SUCCESS
HOST:E2E_HOST_ONLY_VICTIM_TO_GUEST_DISCLOSURE_CONFIRMED
```
The trusted host performs the initial victim-buffer priming read. The final disclosure is obtained independently by the guest through `/dev/vda`; the guest never had access to the victim image or its credentials beforehand. The monitor `qemu-io` call is deterministic trusted-host setup, not an attacker capability; it exercises the same DMG block read path that a host-side image-processing operation would use.
###
## Additional information
Suggested classification:
```text
CWE-908: Use of Uninitialized Resource
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information
```
The attacker DMG does not contain the credential strings recovered by the guest. Its valid LZFSE stream decodes only the single byte `0x41`.
In a separate 4 KiB experiment, QMP was used only for normal disk hotplug and both disk reads were performed by the guest through `virtio-blk`. Three fresh KVM processes all returned a mapped host address: one disclosed libc RVA `0x203b20`, and two disclosed QEMU PIE RVAs `0x6f8d80` (`memory_region_get_container`) and `0x6f8bb0` (`memory_region_resolve_container`). The absolute values changed with ASLR, but their stable RVAs allowed the corresponding load base to be recovered. The result is allocator-dependent; a separate 20-process batch produced libc pointers in five runs and QEMU PIE pointers in two runs.
### Suggested fix
Reject an LZFSE result that does not exactly match the expected output length. Because `lzfse_decode_buffer()` returns the destination capacity both for an exact-size stream and when the destination is too small, decode into an `expected + 1` buffer and require a result of exactly `expected`, with normal overflow checks.
A regression test should use a valid short LZFSE stream with a larger declared sector count and verify that the block read fails without returning any unwritten bytes.
### AI Disclosure
AI-assisted source analysis was used during this investigation. The root cause, affected source path, proof-of-concept images, and all reproduction results were manually reviewed and verified against upstream QEMU v11.1.2.
Reported by: oxsignal(awo@kakao.com)
<!--The line below ensures that proper tags are added to the issue.
Please do not remove it.-->
[attacker-short-1024.dmg](/uploads/04b12909a30394020688896a3e98361d/attacker-short-1024.dmg)
[victim-secrets-1024.dmg](/uploads/ef2b07d97bf72acf661b2486bb5de5e2/victim-secrets-1024.dmg)
[initramfs.cpio.gz](/uploads/7eb538487ad8cad4bff15f3e68506b24/initramfs.cpio.gz)
[reproduce-guest-e2e.py](/uploads/96a48c366d5e451c0bfa81af3f3c8913/reproduce-guest-e2e.py)
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