1. 27 Jun, 2016 7 commits
  2. 15 Jun, 2016 1 commit
  3. 09 Jun, 2016 2 commits
    • Paul Moore's avatar
      netlabel: handle sparse category maps in netlbl_catmap_getlong() · 50b8629a
      Paul Moore authored
      In cases where the category bitmap is sparse enough that gaps exist
      between netlbl_lsm_catmap structs, callers to netlbl_catmap_getlong()
      could find themselves prematurely ending their search through the
      category bitmap.  Further, the methods used to calculate the 'idx'
      and 'off' values were incorrect for bitmaps this large.  This patch
      changes the netlbl_catmap_getlong() behavior so that it always skips
      over gaps and calculates the index and offset values correctly.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      50b8629a
    • Paul Moore's avatar
      selinux: import NetLabel category bitmaps correctly · 8bebe88c
      Paul Moore authored
      The existing ebitmap_netlbl_import() code didn't correctly handle the
      case where the ebitmap_node was not aligned/sized to a power of two,
      this patch fixes this (on x86_64 ebitmap_node contains six bitmaps
      making a range of 0..383).
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      8bebe88c
  4. 07 Jun, 2016 1 commit
  5. 06 Jun, 2016 1 commit
  6. 31 May, 2016 1 commit
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      selinux: Only apply bounds checking to source types · 7ea59202
      Stephen Smalley authored
      The current bounds checking of both source and target types
      requires allowing any domain that has access to the child
      domain to also have the same permissions to the parent, which
      is undesirable.  Drop the target bounds checking.
      
      KaiGai Kohei originally removed all use of target bounds in
      commit 7d52a155 ("selinux: remove dead code in
      type_attribute_bounds_av()") but this was reverted in
      commit 2ae3ba39 ("selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in
      check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()") because it would have
      required explicitly allowing the parent any permissions
      to the child that the child is allowed to itself.
      
      This change in contrast retains the logic for the case where both
      source and target types are bounded, thereby allowing access
      if the parent of the source is allowed the corresponding
      permissions to the parent of the target.  Further, this change
      reworks the logic such that we only perform a single computation
      for each case and there is no ambiguity as to how to resolve
      a bounds violation.
      
      Under the new logic, if the source type and target types are both
      bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same
      permissions to the parent of the target type.  If only the source
      type is bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed
      the same permissions to the target type.
      
      Examples of the new logic and comparisons with the old logic:
      1. If we have:
      	typebounds A B;
      then:
      	allow B self:process <permissions>;
      will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
      	allow A self:process <permissions>;
      is also allowed in policy.
      
      Under the old logic, the allow rule on B satisfies the
      bounds constraint if any of the following three are allowed:
      	allow A B:process <permissions>; or
      	allow B A:process <permissions>; or
      	allow A self:process <permissions>;
      However, either of the first two ultimately require the third to
      satisfy the bounds constraint under the old logic, and therefore
      this degenerates to the same result (but is more efficient - we only
      need to perform one compute_av call).
      
      2. If we have:
      	typebounds A B;
      	typebounds A_exec B_exec;
      then:
      	allow B B_exec:file <permissions>;
      will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
      	allow A A_exec:file <permissions>;
      is also allowed in policy.
      
      This is essentially the same as #1; it is merely included as
      an example of dealing with object types related to a bounded domain
      in a manner that satisfies the bounds relationship.  Note that
      this approach is preferable to leaving B_exec unbounded and having:
      	allow A B_exec:file <permissions>;
      in policy because that would allow B's entrypoints to be used to
      enter A.  Similarly for _tmp or other related types.
      
      3. If we have:
      	typebounds A B;
      and an unbounded type T, then:
      	allow B T:file <permissions>;
      will satisfy the bounds constraint iff:
      	allow A T:file <permissions>;
      is allowed in policy.
      
      The old logic would have been identical for this example.
      
      4. If we have:
      	typebounds A B;
      and an unbounded domain D, then:
      	allow D B:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
      is not subject to any bounds constraints under the new logic
      because D is not bounded.  This is desirable so that we can
      allow a domain to e.g. connectto a child domain without having
      to allow it to do the same to its parent.
      
      The old logic would have required:
      	allow D A:unix_stream_socket <permissions>;
      to also be allowed in policy.
      Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley's avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      [PM: re-wrapped description to appease checkpatch.pl]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      7ea59202
  7. 17 May, 2016 1 commit
  8. 05 May, 2016 2 commits
  9. 04 May, 2016 3 commits
    • Sasha Levin's avatar
      Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting · 74f430cd
      Sasha Levin authored
      Access reporting often happens from atomic contexes. Avoid
      lockups when allocating memory for command lines.
      
      Fixes: 8a56038c ("Yama: consolidate error reporting")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
      74f430cd
    • Mickaël Salaün's avatar
      seccomp: Fix comment typo · 470bf1f2
      Mickaël Salaün authored
      Drop accidentally repeated word in comment.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
      470bf1f2
    • David Howells's avatar
      Merge branch 'keys-trust' into keys-next · d55201ce
      David Howells authored
      Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
      to be trusted.  That's currently a two-step process:
      
       (1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
           the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
           assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
           upon them.
      
           This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring,
           if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new
           certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be
           consulted for whatever process is being undertaken.
      
           If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
           will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
           no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.
      
       (2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
           KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
           with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it.  This was meant to be the
           system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
           A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
           keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
           permit it.
      
      These patches change that:
      
       (1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
           when the trust is evaluated only.
      
       (2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
           restrict what may be added to that keyring.  This is called whenever a
           key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
           created in one keyring and then linked across.
      
           This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
           payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation.  It
           is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
           keyrings such as the system keyrings.
      
           [*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
               optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
               so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.
      
       (3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
           restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
           contents of the system keyring.
      
           A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM.
      
       (4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
           so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
           root of the trust relationship.
      
       (5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
           key_preparsed_payload::trusted.
      
      This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private
      set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function
      where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust
      relationships.
      
      Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
      and making them generally global:
      
       (*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
           only.  It carries only keys built in to the kernel.  It may be where
           UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
           secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring.
      
       (*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
           is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.
      
           (*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
               be vouched for by either ring of system keys.
      
       (*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
           the new secondary keyring.
      
       (*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as
           that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings.
      
       (*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,
           is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the
           restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the
           system keyrings.
      
           If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to
           the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in
           the builtin system keyring only.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      d55201ce
  10. 01 May, 2016 3 commits
    • Mimi Zohar's avatar
      ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall · 05d1a717
      Mimi Zohar authored
      Commit 3034a146 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files"
      stopped identifying empty files as new files.  However new empty files
      can be created using the mknodat syscall.  On systems with IMA-appraisal
      enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended
      attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in
      order to write the file data contents.  This patch defines a new hook
      named ima_post_path_mknod() to mark these empty files, created using
      mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data contents to be written.
      
      In addition, files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature
      are considered "immutable" and can not be modified.  The file contents
      need to be written, before signing the file.  This patch relaxes this
      requirement for new files, allowing the file signature to be written
      before the file contents.
      
      Changelog:
      - defer identifying files with signatures stored as security.ima
        (based on Dmitry Rozhkov's comments)
      - removing tests (eg. dentry, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_size == 0)
        (based on Al's review)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Cc: Al Viro <<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Tested-by: default avatarDmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
      05d1a717
    • Mimi Zohar's avatar
      ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr · 42a4c603
      Mimi Zohar authored
      Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to
      re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file"
      status nor the security.ima xattr.  The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and
      IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific.  This patch
      only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags.
      
      With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the
      file signature on new files.
      Reported-by: default avatarDmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarDmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
      42a4c603
    • Dmitry Kasatkin's avatar
      vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory · 39d637af
      Dmitry Kasatkin authored
      This patch is based on top of the "vfs: support for a common kernel file
      loader" patch set.  In general when the kernel is reading a file into
      memory it does not want anything else writing to it.
      
      The kernel currently only forbids write access to a file being executed.
      This patch extends this locking to files being read by the kernel.
      
      Changelog:
      - moved function to kernel_read_file() - Mimi
      - updated patch description - Mimi
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      39d637af
  11. 27 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  12. 26 Apr, 2016 2 commits
  13. 21 Apr, 2016 6 commits
  14. 19 Apr, 2016 3 commits
  15. 14 Apr, 2016 1 commit
    • Prarit Bhargava's avatar
      selinux: Change bool variable name to index. · 0fd71a62
      Prarit Bhargava authored
      security_get_bool_value(int bool) argument "bool" conflicts with
      in-kernel macros such as BUILD_BUG().  This patch changes this to
      index which isn't a type.
      
      Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
      Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
      Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
      Cc: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
      Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
      Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
      Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava's avatarPrarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      [PM: wrapped description for checkpatch.pl, use "selinux:..." as subj]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      0fd71a62
  16. 12 Apr, 2016 5 commits
    • David Howells's avatar
      Merge branch 'keys-sig' into keys-next · b6e17c1b
      David Howells authored
      These commits do the following:
      
       (1) Retain a signature in an asymmetric-type key and associate with it the
           identifiers that will match a key that can be used to verify it.
      
       (2) Differentiate an X.509 cert that cannot be used versus one that cannot
           be verified due to unavailable crypto.  This is noted in the
           structures involved.
      
       (3) Determination of the self-signedness of an X.509 cert is improved to
           include checks on the subject/issuer names and the key
           algorithm/signature algorithm types.
      
       (4) Self-signed X.509 certificates are consistency checked early on if the
           appropriate crypto is available.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      b6e17c1b
    • David Howells's avatar
      Merge branch 'keys-misc' into keys-next · 6e007f31
      David Howells authored
      Miscellaneous keyrings changes.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      6e007f31
    • Mat Martineau's avatar
      KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command · ddbb4114
      Mat Martineau authored
      This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a
      new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public
      keys using input parameters stored in the keyring.
      
      Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit
      for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid
      exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys.
      
      The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption
      that the values are only needed in userspace.
      
      Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new
      command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE.
      
      Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code
      can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible
      hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      ddbb4114
    • Kirill Marinushkin's avatar
      Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted · 13100a72
      Kirill Marinushkin authored
      Solved TODO task: big keys saved to shmem file are now stored encrypted.
      The encryption key is randomly generated and saved to payload[big_key_data].
      Signed-off-by: Kirill Marinushkin's avatarKirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      13100a72
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: user_update should use copy of payload made during preparsing · 898de7d0
      David Howells authored
      The payload preparsing routine for user keys makes a copy of the payload
      provided by the caller and stashes it in the key_preparsed_payload struct for
      ->instantiate() or ->update() to use.  However, ->update() takes another copy
      of this to attach to the keyring.  ->update() should be using this directly
      and clearing the pointer in the preparse data.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      898de7d0