Commit 4bdf0bc3 authored by David Howells's avatar David Howells

KEYS: Introduce a search context structure

Search functions pass around a bunch of arguments, each of which gets copied
with each call.  Introduce a search context structure to hold these.

Whilst we're at it, create a search flag that indicates whether the search
should be directly to the description or whether it should iterate through all
keys looking for a non-description match.

This will be useful when keyrings use a generic data struct with generic
routines to manage their content as the search terms can just be passed
through to the iterator callback function.

Also, for future use, the data to be supplied to the match function is
separated from the description pointer in the search context.  This makes it
clear which is being supplied.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
parent 16feef43
......@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ struct key_type {
*/
size_t def_datalen;
/* Default key search algorithm. */
unsigned def_lookup_type;
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT 0x0000 /* Direct lookup by description. */
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE 0x0001 /* Iterative search. */
/* vet a description */
int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
......
......@@ -107,23 +107,31 @@ extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
struct keyring_search_context {
struct keyring_index_key index_key;
const struct cred *cred;
key_match_func_t match;
const void *match_data;
unsigned flags;
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE 0x0001 /* [as type->def_lookup_type] */
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK 0x0002 /* Skip state checks */
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK 0x0004 /* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME 0x0008 /* Don't update times */
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM 0x0010 /* Don't check permissions */
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP 0x0020 /* Give an error on excessive depth */
/* Internal stuff */
int skipped_ret;
bool possessed;
key_ref_t result;
struct timespec now;
};
extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
bool no_state_check);
extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred);
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred);
struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
......
......@@ -280,11 +280,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
/**
* keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria
* @keyring_ref: A pointer to the keyring with possession indicator.
* @cred: The credentials to use for permissions checks.
* @type: The type of key to search for.
* @description: Parameter for @match.
* @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required.
* @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad
* @ctx: The keyring search context.
*
* Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
* The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
......@@ -314,11 +310,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
* @keyring_ref is propagated to the returned key reference.
*/
key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
bool no_state_check)
struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
{
struct {
/* Need a separate keylist pointer for RCU purposes */
......@@ -328,20 +320,18 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
struct keyring_list *keylist;
struct timespec now;
unsigned long kflags;
struct key *keyring, *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
bool possessed;
long err;
int sp, nkeys, kix;
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
ctx->possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
key_check(keyring);
/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
if (err < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
goto error;
......@@ -353,7 +343,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
rcu_read_lock();
now = current_kernel_time();
ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
err = -EAGAIN;
sp = 0;
......@@ -361,16 +351,17 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
* are looking for */
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
kflags = keyring->flags;
if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) {
if (keyring->type == ctx->index_key.type &&
ctx->match(keyring, ctx->match_data)) {
key = keyring;
if (no_state_check)
if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
goto found;
/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
* revoked */
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
goto error_2;
if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
goto error_2;
key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
......@@ -384,7 +375,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
(1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
(1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) ||
(keyring->expiry && now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
(keyring->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
goto error_2;
/* start processing a new keyring */
......@@ -406,29 +397,29 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
kflags = key->flags;
/* ignore keys not of this type */
if (key->type != type)
if (key->type != ctx->index_key.type)
continue;
/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
if (!no_state_check) {
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)) {
if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
(1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
continue;
if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
continue;
}
/* keys that don't match */
if (!match(key, description))
if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data))
continue;
/* key must have search permissions */
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
if (no_state_check)
if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK)
goto found;
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
......@@ -456,8 +447,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
continue;
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* stack the current position */
......@@ -489,12 +480,12 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
/* we found a viable match */
found:
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
while (sp > 0)
stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
key_check(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, possessed);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed);
error_2:
rcu_read_unlock();
error:
......@@ -514,11 +505,20 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
struct key_type *type,
const char *description)
{
if (!type->match)
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match = type->match,
.match_data = description,
.flags = (type->def_lookup_type |
KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK),
};
if (!ctx.match)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
type, description, type->match, false);
return keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
......
......@@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
struct timespec now;
......@@ -191,15 +190,23 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
char xbuf[12];
int rc;
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = key->type,
.index_key.description = key->description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data = key,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
};
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
* skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
*/
if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
true, cred);
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
......@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
* - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
* access to __current_cred() safe
*/
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, KEY_VIEW);
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
......
......@@ -319,11 +319,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
* In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
* returned key reference.
*/
key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred)
key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
{
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
......@@ -339,10 +335,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
/* search the thread keyring first */
if (cred->thread_keyring) {
if (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
make_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
......@@ -358,10 +353,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
/* search the process keyring second */
if (cred->process_keyring) {
if (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
make_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
......@@ -379,11 +373,11 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
/* search the session keyring */
if (cred->session_keyring) {
if (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {
rcu_read_lock();
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring), 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),
ctx);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
......@@ -402,10 +396,10 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
}
/* or search the user-session keyring */
else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
else if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
make_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
......@@ -437,19 +431,14 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
*
* Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().
*/
key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred)
key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;
might_sleep();
key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
no_state_check, cred);
key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
err = key_ref;
......@@ -458,19 +447,21 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
* search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
* - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
*/
if (cred->request_key_auth &&
cred == current_cred() &&
type != &key_type_request_key_auth
if (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&
ctx->cred == current_cred() &&
ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth
) {
const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;
/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
match, no_state_check,
rka->cred);
ctx->cred = rka->cred;
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
ctx->cred = cred;
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
......@@ -524,19 +515,23 @@ int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
key_perm_t perm)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.match = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
};
struct request_key_auth *rka;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
try_again:
cred = get_current_cred();
ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
......@@ -548,13 +543,13 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
goto reget_creds;
}
key = cred->thread_keyring;
key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
if (!cred->process_keyring) {
if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
......@@ -566,13 +561,13 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
goto reget_creds;
}
key = cred->process_keyring;
key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!cred->session_keyring) {
if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
ret = install_user_keyrings();
......@@ -582,13 +577,13 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
else
ret = install_session_keyring(
cred->user->session_keyring);
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
} else if (cred->session_keyring ==
cred->user->session_keyring &&
} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (ret < 0)
......@@ -597,32 +592,32 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
}
rcu_read_lock();
key = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring);
key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = cred->user->session_keyring;
key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
......@@ -633,7 +628,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
key = cred->request_key_auth;
key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
if (!key)
goto error;
......@@ -642,20 +637,20 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
break;
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
if (!cred->request_key_auth)
if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
goto error;
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
key = NULL;
} else {
rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key = rka->dest_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
}
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!key)
goto error;
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
......@@ -675,9 +670,13 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* check to see if we possess the key */
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
true, cred);
ctx.index_key.type = key->type;
ctx.index_key.description = key->description;
ctx.index_key.desc_len = strlen(key->description);
ctx.match_data = key;
kdebug("check possessed");
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
......@@ -717,14 +716,14 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
error:
put_cred(cred);
put_cred(ctx.cred);
return key_ref;
invalid_key:
......@@ -735,7 +734,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
* creds to be installed */
reget_creds:
put_cred(cred);
put_cred(ctx.cred);
goto try_again;
}
......
......@@ -345,38 +345,34 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
* May return a key that's already under construction instead if there was a
* race between two thread calling request_key().
*/
static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags,
struct key_user *user,
struct key **_key)
{
const struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
.type = type,
.description = description,
.desc_len = strlen(description),
};
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
unsigned long prealloc;
struct key *key;
key_perm_t perm;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
kenter("%s,%s,,,", type->name, description);
kenter("%s,%s,,,",
ctx->index_key.type->name, ctx->index_key.description);
*_key = NULL;
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
if (type->read)
if (ctx->index_key.type->read)
perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
if (type == &key_type_keyring || type->update)
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
ctx->index_key.type->update)
perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,
ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,
perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
......@@ -384,7 +380,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
if (dest_keyring) {
ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &index_key, &prealloc);
ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, &prealloc);
if (ret < 0)
goto link_prealloc_failed;
}
......@@ -394,8 +390,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
* waited for locks */
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
false, cred);
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto key_already_present;
......@@ -404,7 +399,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (dest_keyring)
__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
*_key = key;
kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
......@@ -420,7 +415,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
if (ret == 0)
__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &index_key, prealloc);
__key_link_end(dest_keyring, &ctx->index_key, prealloc);
if (ret < 0)
goto link_check_failed;
}
......@@ -449,8 +444,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
/*
* Commence key construction.
*/
static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
const char *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
......@@ -469,8 +463,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
ret = construct_alloc_key(type, description, dest_keyring, flags, user,
&key);
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
if (ret == 0) {
......@@ -534,18 +527,24 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match = type->match,
.match_data = description,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
};
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
type->name, description, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
dest_keyring, flags);
ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
false, cred);
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
......@@ -568,9 +567,8 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
if (!callout_info)
goto error;
key = construct_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info,
callout_len, aux, dest_keyring,
flags);
key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,
aux, dest_keyring, flags);
}
error:
......
......@@ -239,15 +239,17 @@ static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
*/
struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();