1. 31 Oct, 2018 1 commit
  2. 26 Oct, 2018 1 commit
  3. 23 Oct, 2018 2 commits
  4. 16 Oct, 2018 1 commit
  5. 20 Sep, 2018 2 commits
  6. 04 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  7. 01 Aug, 2018 1 commit
  8. 31 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  9. 27 Jul, 2018 2 commits
  10. 16 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  11. 13 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  12. 18 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  13. 18 May, 2018 1 commit
  14. 09 May, 2018 1 commit
  15. 08 May, 2018 2 commits
    • Oscar Guindzberg's avatar
      Limit initial size of some structures · 26adf689
      Oscar Guindzberg authored
      Limits initial size of these structures:
      - Inputs and Outputs in Transaction
      - Transactions in Block
      - Hashes in PartialMerkleeTree
      
      The fix prevents this DoS attack:
      - Somehow the attacker needs to get a p2p connection to the bitcoinj node.
      - The attacker sends a tx msg that says the tx contains a trillion inputs (or a similar msg attacking any other of the structures described above).
      - bitcoinj tries to instantiate an ArrayList with a size of a trillion.
      OutOfMemoryError and the bitcoinj node is down.
      26adf689
    • Oscar Guindzberg's avatar
      TransactionWitness: Store pushes in a List<byte[]> · a6c356c4
      Oscar Guindzberg authored
      This is a pre-requisite to fix the exploit to its initial size
      a6c356c4
  16. 05 May, 2018 1 commit
  17. 01 May, 2018 3 commits
  18. 21 Apr, 2018 2 commits
  19. 20 Apr, 2018 1 commit
  20. 18 Apr, 2018 2 commits
  21. 16 Apr, 2018 2 commits
  22. 15 Apr, 2018 2 commits
  23. 07 Apr, 2018 5 commits
  24. 06 Apr, 2018 3 commits