Commit 16e28042 authored by Mati's avatar Mati

Imported Upstream version 0.4

parents

Too many changes to show.

To preserve performance only 288 of 288+ files are displayed.

CREATE OR REPLACE AND COMPILE JAVA SOURCE NAMED "RunC" AS
import java.io.*;
public class RunC{
public static String Run(String cmd){
try{
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream()));
String line = null;
String result = "";
while((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
result += line + "\n");
}
return(result);
}
catch (Exception e){
return(e.getMessage());
}
}
}
/
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# The IKE Scanner (ike-scan) is Copyright (C) 2003-2007 Roy Hills,
# NTA Monitor Ltd.
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
# of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
#
# If this license is unacceptable to you, I may be willing to negotiate
# alternative licenses (contact ike-scan@nta-monitor.com).
#
# $Id: ike-vendor-ids 9884 2007-01-14 19:05:39Z rsh $
#
# ike-vendor-ids -- File containing known Vendor IDs for ike-scan
#
# Author: Roy Hills <Roy.Hills@nta-monitor.com>
#
# Format:
# Implementation_Name<Tab>Vendor_ID_Pattern
#
# The Vendor_ID_Pattern should be specified as a Posix extended regular
# expression that will match the hex value of the Vendor ID. The Posix regular
# expression routines "regcomp" and "regexec" are used to compile and
# match the patterns.
#
# The hex value of the Vendor ID can only contain the characters [0-9a-f].
# The regular expression match is case insensitive so you can use either
# upper or lower case letters [A-F] in the pattern, although I recommend that
# you use only lower-case for consistency.
#
# The pattern is not anchored by default. If you want to match from the
# beginning of the vendor ID hex value (which is normally the case), you
# should start your pattern with "^" to anchor it at the beginning of the hex
# value. If you don't want to allow any extra trailing data, you should end
# the pattern with "$" to anchor it at the end of the hex value.
#
# Each entry must be on one line. A line can be up to 254 characters long.
# To allow for longer lines, adjust the MAXLINE macro in ike-scan.h
#
# Lines beginning with '#' and blank lines are ignored.
#
# The input format is quite strict. In particular, the separator between
# the implementation name and the VendorID pattern must be a single TAB and
# not a space.
#
# If you have problems adding entries, run ike-scan as:
# ike-scan -v -v -v <any-target>
# Which will dump the VendorID pattern table.
#
# You are encouraged to send comments, improvements or suggestions to
# me at ike-scan@nta-monitor.com.
#
# Microsoft/Cisco IPsec implementation for Win-2000 and above.
# The first 16 bytes are the MD5 hash of "MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY"
# The next four bytes appear to be a version number in big endian format
# The observed version numbers are:
#
# 2 Windows 2000
# 3 Windows XP SP1
# 4 Windows 2003 and Windows XP SP2
# 5 Windows Vista (tested against Beta 2 build 5384)
#
Windows-2000 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000002
Windows-XP-SP1 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000003
Windows-2003-or-XP-SP2 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000004
Windows-Vista ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000005
# Checkpoint Firewall-1/VPN-1
#
# Firewall-1 v4.0 didn't use Vendor IDs. v3.0 and below didn't support IPsec.
#
# This is a 40-byte Vendor ID, which consists of the following fields:
#
# Bytes Description
# 1-20 Checkpoint VID (Probably an SHA1 hash of something)
# 21-24 Product (1=Firewall-1, 2=SecuRemote/SecureClient)
# 25-28 Encoded Version number
# 29-32 Timestamp (NGX only; always zero in 4.1 or NG)
# 33-36 Reserved
# 37-40 Features
#
# The Checkpoint VID is "f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f". I suspect
# that this is an SHA1 hash of something, but I don't know what the input text
# is.
#
# The Product is either 1 (0x00000001) for Firewall-1/VPN-1 or 2 (0x00000002)
# for SecuRemote/SecureClient (Checkpoint's VPN client).
#
# The encoded version number is described in the URL below.
#
# The timestamp field contains the Firewall's date and time encoded as seconds
# since 1st Jan 1970 (standard Unix epoch). Only NGX fills this in; it is
# always zero on 4.1 and NG.
#
# The first byte of the features field contains the number of bits used. This
# is normally 0x18 (24). The remaining three bytes (24 bits) are feature
# flags.
#
# Firewall-1 4.1 and NG only returns a Vendor ID if you send a Vendor ID
# payload starting with the Checkpoint VID. Firewall-1 NGX always returns
# a Vendor ID, regardless of whether the client sends the Checkpoint VID
# or not.
#
# See http://www.nta-monitor.com/news/checkpoint2004/index.htm for full details
#
Firewall-1 4.1 Base ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000000020000000000000000........
Firewall-1 4.1 SP1 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000000030000000000000000........
Firewall-1 4.1 SP2-SP6 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f0000000100000fa20000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG Base ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000013880000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG FP1 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000013890000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG FP2 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138a0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG FP3 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138b0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG AI R54 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138c0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG AI R55 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138d0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NGX ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138d........00000000........
Firewall-1 Unknown Vsn ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f
# Dead Peer Detection (DPD), detailed in RFC 3706.
# This is a truncated MD5 hash of "CISCO-DEAD-PEER-DETECTION"
# The last 2 bytes (4 hex chars) are major & minor version.
# The current version, and the only one that has been observed, is 1.0.
# Thanks to Hakan Olsson for clarifing this.
Dead Peer Detection v1.0 ^afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc77570100
Dead Peer Detection ^afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc7757....
# XAUTH
# This is a truncated MD5 hash of "draft-ietf-ipsra-isakmp-xauth-06.txt"
# IPSRA = "IP Security Remote Access"
# Also known as "draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth-02.txt"
XAUTH ^09002689dfd6b712
# SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express
# These VIDs are MD5 hashes of the text
# "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version x.y.z" or
# "Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version x.y.z"
# Where x.y.z is the version, e.g. 1.1.0
SSH IPSEC Express 1.1.0 ^fbf47614984031fa8e3bb6198089b223
SSH IPSEC Express 1.1.1 ^1952dc91ac20f646fb01cf42a33aee30
SSH IPSEC Express 1.1.2 ^e8bffa643e5c8f2cd10fda7370b6ebe5
SSH IPSEC Express 1.2.1 ^c1111b2dee8cbc3d620573ec57aab9cb
SSH IPSEC Express 1.2.2 ^09ec27bfbc09c75823cfecbffe565a2e
SSH IPSEC Express 2.0.0 ^7f21a596e4e318f0b2f4944c2384cb84
SSH IPSEC Express 2.1.0 ^2836d1fd2807bc9e5ae30786320451ec
SSH IPSEC Express 2.1.1 ^a68de756a9c5229bae66498040951ad5
SSH IPSEC Express 2.1.2 ^3f2372867e237c1cd8250a75559cae20
SSH IPSEC Express 3.0.0 ^0e58d5774df602007d0b02443660f7eb
SSH IPSEC Express 3.0.1 ^f5ce31ebc210f44350cf71265b57380f
SSH IPSEC Express 4.0.0 ^f64260af2e2742daddd56987068a99a0
SSH IPSEC Express 4.0.1 ^7a54d3bdb3b1e6d923892064be2d981c
SSH IPSEC Express 4.1.0 ^9aa1f3b43472a45d5f506aeb260cf214
SSH IPSEC Express 4.1.1 ^89f7b760d86b012acf263382394d962f
SSH IPSEC Express 4.2.0 ^6880c7d026099114e486c55430e7abee
SSH IPSEC Express 5.0 ^b037a21aceccb5570f602546f97bde8c
SSH IPSEC Express 5.0.0 ^2b2dad97c4d140930053287f996850b0
SSH IPSEC Express 5.1.0 ^45e17f3abe93944cb202910c59ef806b
SSH IPSEC Express 5.1.1 ^5925859f7377ed7816d2fb81c01fa551
# Cisco Unity compliant peer. VID is the MD5 hash of "CISCO-UNITY" with
# the last two bytes replaced with 0x0100.
Cisco Unity ^12f5f28c457168a9702d9fe274cc0100
# Cisco VPN 3000 Concentrator (formerly Altega Networks)
# There are several models: 3005, 3015, 3020, 3030, 3060 and 3080, which are
# equivalent to the old Altiga C5, C15 Etc.
#
# The VPN 3000 client VID is the MD5 hash of "ALTIGA NETWORKS"
# The VPN 3000 concentrator VID is a truncated MD5 hash of "ALTIGA GATEWAY"
#
# I've seen this pattern with trailing 500306 and 500400. I suspect that
# the last two bytes indicate the version number, e.g 0306 = 3.0.6. However,
# I need more examples before I'm confident that this is the case, so for
# now I'm just including the generic pattern.
VPN-3000-client ^f6f7efc7f5aeb8cb158cb9d094ba69e7
Cisco VPN Concentrator ^1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a
# IKE Fragmentation. VID is the MD5 hash of the text "FRAGMENTATION"
# I've seen extra bytes on the end of a fragmentation VID payload, e.g.
# c0000000 and 80000000. I don't know what these represent.
IKE Fragmentation ^4048b7d56ebce88525e7de7f00d6c2d3
# Various IKE Internet drafts. The VID payload is the MD5 hash of the
# implementation name given below.
draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01 ^27bab5dc01ea0760ea4e3190ac27c0d0
draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02 ^6105c422e76847e43f9684801292aecd
draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt ^6a7434c19d7e36348090a02334c9c805
# SafeNet SoftRemote VPN Client.
# Extra data has been observed at the end of this VID payload.
SafeNet SoftRemote ^47bbe7c993f1fc13b4e6d0db565c68e5
# HeartBeat Notify.
# VID is ASCII "HeartBeat_Notify"
# Extra data has been observed at the end of this VID payload. It is
# suspected that this may be a version number. E.g:
# 4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679386b0100
Heartbeat Notify ^4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679
# OpenPGP
OpenPGP ^4f70656e5047503130313731
# draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-01.txt
# VID is an MD5 hash of "ESPThruNAT"
ESPThruNAT ^50760f624c63e5c53eea386c685ca083
# SSH Sentinel.
# These VIDs are MD5 hashes of the implementation names given below.
SSH Sentinel ^054182a07c7ae206f9d2cf9d2432c482
SSH Sentinel 1.1 ^b91623e693ca18a54c6a2778552305e8
SSH Sentinel 1.2 ^5430888de01a31a6fa8f60224e449958
SSH Sentinel 1.3 ^7ee5cb85f71ce259c94a5c731ee4e752
SSH Sentinel 1.4 ^63d9a1a7009491b5a0a6fdeb2a8284f0
SSH Sentinel 1.4.1 ^eb4b0d96276b4e220ad16221a7b2a5e6
# Timestep VID is ASCII "TIMESTEP" (54494d4553544550) followed by further
# ASCII characters which seem to indicate a version number. e.g:
# 54494d455354455020312053475720313532302033313520322e303145303133
# which is "TIMESTEP 1 SGW 1520 315 2.01E013"
Timestep ^54494d4553544550
# VID is MD5 hash of "KAME/racoon"
KAME/racoon ^7003cbc1097dbe9c2600ba6983bc8b35
# Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE - previously IETF draft, now RFC.
# The VID is the MD5 hash of the implementation name given below.
# The trailing newline (\n) on one entry is explained in
# http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/2002/04/msg00233.html
# Jan 2005: RFC released as RFC 3947 "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE"
# VID is MD5 hash of "RFC 3947"
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike ^4df37928e9fc4fd1b3262170d515c662
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00 ^4485152d18b6bbcd0be8a8469579ddcc
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01 ^16f6ca16e4a4066d83821a0f0aeaa862
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n ^90cb80913ebb696e086381b5ec427b1f
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02 ^cd60464335df21f87cfdb2fc68b6a448
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03 ^7d9419a65310ca6f2c179d9215529d56
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-04 ^9909b64eed937c6573de52ace952fa6b
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-05 ^80d0bb3def54565ee84645d4c85ce3ee
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-06 ^4d1e0e136deafa34c4f3ea9f02ec7285
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-07 ^439b59f8ba676c4c7737ae22eab8f582
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-08 ^8f8d83826d246b6fc7a8a6a428c11de8
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-09 ^42ea5b6f898d9773a575df26e7dd19e1
Testing NAT-T RFC ^c40fee00d5d39ddb1fc762e09b7cfea7
RFC 3947 NAT-T ^4a131c81070358455c5728f20e95452f
# A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE - draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-gss-auth
# This is used by Windows 2000 and later. Specific Windows VIDs are in a
# separate section.
# Note that the MD5 hash for "A GSS-API ..." in draft version 07 is given as
# the hash of the string with a newline appended. I think that this is an
# error, so I've added patterns both with and without the trailing newline.
MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e461
A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE ^ad2c0dd0b9c32083ccba25b8861ec455
A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE\n ^b46d8914f3aaa3f2fedeb7c7db2943ca
GSSAPI ^621b04bb09882ac1e15935fefa24aeee
# Nortel Contivity VPN Router (was Bay Networks Enterprise Switch)
# The first 4 bytes are ASCII "BNES" (Bay Networks Enterprise Switch)
# The second 4 bytes appear to be a version number in big endian format.
# I've seen values 00000004, 00000005, 00000007, 00000009 and 0000000a in
# this position.
Nortel Contivity ^424e4553000000..
# Observed to be sent from SonicWall Firewalls
SonicWall ^404bf439522ca3f6
# SSH QuickSec
# The VIDs are the MD5 hashes of "SSH Communications Security QuickSec x.y.z"
# Where x.y.z is the version number
SSH QuickSec 0.9.0 ^37eba0c4136184e7daf8562a77060b4a
SSH QuickSec 1.1.0 ^5d72925e55948a9661a7fc48fdec7ff9
SSH QuickSec 1.1.1 ^777fbf4c5af6d1cdd4b895a05bf82594
SSH QuickSec 1.1.2 ^2cdf08e712ede8a5978761267cd19b91
SSH QuickSec 1.1.3 ^59e454a8c2cf02a34959121f1890bc87
# VIDs are MD5 hash of:
# "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys"
# "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys (Revised)"
# both without and with trailing newline.
IKE Challenge-Response ^ba290499c24e84e53a1d83a05e5f00c9
IKE Challenge-Response-2 ^0d33611a5d521b5e3c9c03d2fc107e12
IKE Challenge-Response Revised ^ad3251042cdc4652c9e0734ce5de4c7d
IKE Challenge-Response Revised-2 ^13f11823f966fa91900f024ba66a86ba
# draft-krywaniuk-ipsec-antireplay-00.txt - Using Isakmp Message Ids for
# Replay Protection
#
# "They may also be enabled in the short term by mutual exchange of the
# vendor id 0x325df29a2319f2dd"
draft-krywaniuk-ipsec-antireplay-00 ^325df29a2319f2dd
# draft-ietf-ipsec-heartbeats-00.txt - Using Isakmp Heartbeats for Dead Peer
# Detection
# The draft says that the VID is a truncated MD5 hash of
# "draft-ietf-krywaniuk-ipsec-heartbeats-00.txt"
# but it is not.
draft-ietf-ipsec-heartbeats-00 ^8db7a41811221660
# MacOS X
# Unconfirmed, from StrongSwan vendor.c
MacOS 10.x ^4d6163204f53582031302e78
# strongSwan
# VID is MD5 hash of "strongSwan x.y.z" where x.y.z is version number
# Obtained from strongSwan 4.0.5 pluto/vendor.c
strongSwan 4.0.5 ^dd180d21e5ce655a768ba32211dd8ad9
strongSwan 4.0.4 ^1ef283f83549b5ff9608b6d634f84d75
strongSwan 4.0.3 ^b181b18e114fc209b3c6e26c3a80718e
strongSwan 4.0.2 ^77e8eea6f556a499de3ffe7f7f95661c
strongSwan 4.0.1 ^9dbbafcf1db0dd595ae065294003ad3e
strongSwan 4.0.0 ^2ce9c946a4c879bf11b50b76cc5692cb
strongSwan 2.8.0 ^32f0e9b9c06dfe8c9ad5599a636971a1
strongSwan 2.7.3 ^7f50cc4ebf04c2d9da73abfd69b77aa2
strongSwan 2.7.2 ^a194e2aaddd0bafb95253dd96dc733eb
strongSwan 2.7.1 ^8134878582121785ba65ea345d6ba724
strongSwan 2.7.0 ^07fa128e4754f9447b1dd46374eef360
strongSwan 2.6.4 ^b927f95219a0fe3600dba3c1182ae55f
strongSwan 2.6.3 ^b2860e7837f711bef3d0eeb106872ded
strongSwan 2.6.2 ^5b1cd6fe7d050eda6c93871c107db3d2
strongSwan 2.6.1 ^66afbc12bbfe6ce108b1f69f4bc917b7
strongSwan 2.6.0 ^3f3266499ffdbd85950e702298062844
strongSwan 2.5.7 ^1f4442296b83d7e33a8b45209ba0e590
strongSwan 2.5.6 ^3c5eba3d8564928e32ae43c3d9924dee
strongSwan 2.5.5 ^3f267ed621ada7ee6c7d8893ccb0b14b
strongSwan 2.5.4 ^7a6bf5b7df89642a75a78ef7d657c1c0
strongSwan 2.5.3 ^df5b1f0f1d5679d9f8512b16c55a6065
strongSwan 2.5.2 ^861ce5eb72164b190e9e629a31cf4901
strongSwan 2.5.1 ^9a4a4648f60f8eda7cfcbfe271ee5b7d
strongSwan 2.5.0 ^9eb3d907ed7ada4e3cbcacb917abc8e4
strongSwan 2.4.4 ^485a70361b4433b31dea1c6be0df243e
strongSwan 2.4.3 ^982b7a063a33c143a8eadc88249f6bcc
strongSwan 2.4.2 ^e7a3fd0c6d771a8f1b8a86a4169c9ea4
strongSwan 2.4.1 ^75b0653cb281eb26d31ede38c8e1e228
strongSwan 2.4.0 ^e829c88149bab3c0cee85da60e18ae9b
strongSwan 2.3.2 ^42a4834c92ab9a7777063afa254bcb69
strongSwan 2.3.1 ^f697c1afcc2ec8ddcdf99dc7af03a67f
strongSwan 2.3.0 ^b8f92b2fa2d3fe5fe158344bda1cc6ae
strongSwan 2.2.2 ^99dc7cc823376b3b33d04357896ae07b
strongSwan 2.2.1 ^d9118b1e9de5efced9cc9d883f2168ff
strongSwan 2.2.0 ^85b6cbec480d5c8cd9882c825ac2c244
# ZyXEL ZyWALL router
# Observed on several devices. HTTP interface shows that they are XyWALL
# I suspect that this VID is an SHA-1 hash of something because of the length
XyXEL ZyWALL Router ^b858d1addd08c1e8adafea150608aa4497aa6cc8
# Microsoft Initial Contact
# VID is MD5 hash of "Vid-Initial-Contact"
Microsoft Initial-Contact ^26244d38eddb61b3172a36e3d0cfb819
# FreeS/WAN and Openswan
# VID is a 12-byte printable string. The first two bytes are "OE", which
# stands for "Opportunistic Encryption" (the FreeS/WAN designers were
# enthusiastic about opportunistic encryption); the remaining ten bytes are
# a truncated, "ASCIIfied" MD5 hash of the implementation name given below.
# The "ASCIIfication" process involves clearing bit 7 and setting bit 6 in
# each byte, thus constraining the range to 64-127 inclusive.
# I think that support for this VID was added in FreeS/WAN 2.00, and carried
# over into openswan 2.x.
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.00 ^4f45486b7d44784d42676b5d
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.01 ^4f457c4f547e6e615b426e56
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.02 ^4f456c6b44696d7f6b4c4e60
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.03 ^4f45566671474962734e6264
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.04 ^4f45704f736579505c6e5f6d
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.05 ^4f457271785f4c7e496f4d54
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.06 ^4f457e4c466e5d427c5c6b52
Openswan 2.2.0 ^4f4548724b6e5e68557c604f
Openswan 2.3.0 ^4f4572696f5c77557f746249
# OpenPGP
# VID starts with ASCII "OpenPGP". This is generally followed by some extra
# data, e.g. "OpenPGP10171", but we don't match that.
OpenPGP ^4f70656e504750
# Observed on Fortinet ForteGate Firewalls.
# Probably an MD5 hash of something.
FortiGate ^1d6e178f6c2c0be284985465450fe9d4
# Juniper NetScreen running ScreenOS
#
# There are many different entries for this implementation, because the VID
# varies depending on the s/w version and h/w model, and maybe other things
# as well.
#
# The first 20 bytes are suspected to be an SHA1 hash of something.
# This suspected hash appears to include the s/w version and the h/w platform.
#
# This is followed by eight bytes, which we don't include in the pattern.
# This eight bytes consists of two four-byte values in big endian format,
# e.g. 0000000900000500, the last four bytes appear to indicate the ScreenOS
# version.
#
# Examples:
#
# For the examples below, we show the entire VID, the netscreen model, and
# the ScreenOS version number.
#
# 64405f46f03b7660a23be116a1975058e69e83870000000400000403 ns5xp 4.0.3r3.0
# 299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b760000000900000500 ns5xp 5.0.0r1.0
# 299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b760000000900000500 ns5xp 5.0.0r6.0
# 299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b760000000900000500 ns5xp 5.0.0r9.0
# 4a4340b543e02b84c88a8b96a8af9ebe77d9accc0000000b00000500 ns5gt 5.0.0r7.1
# 2a2bcac19b8e91b426107807e02e7249569d6fd30000000b0000050a ns5gt 5.1.0r1.0
# 166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd84510000000000000000 ns5gt 5.2.0r3b.0
# 166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd84510000000000000000 ns5gt 5.3.0r4.0
# 166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd84510000000000000000 ns5gt 5.4.0r1.0
# a35bfd05ca1ac0b3d2f24e9e82bfcbff9c9e52b50000000b00000514 unknown unknown
#
# The Netscreen hardware referenced above is:
#
# ns5xp model NS-5XP
# ns5gt model NS-5GT-103 serial no 0064062004015770
#
# Netscreens also return:
# 4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679386b0100 (Heartbeat Notify)
# In addition, ScreenOS Version 5.3 and 5.4 returns:
# afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc77570100 (Dead Peer Detection)
#
Netscreen-01 ^299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b76
Netscreen-02 ^3a15e1f3cf2a63582e3ac82d1c64cbe3b6d779e7
Netscreen-03 ^47d2b126bfcd83489760e2cf8c5d4d5a03497c15
Netscreen-04 ^4a4340b543e02b84c88a8b96a8af9ebe77d9accc
Netscreen-05 ^64405f46f03b7660a23be116a1975058e69e8387
Netscreen-06 ^699369228741c6d4ca094c93e242c9de19e7b7c6
Netscreen-07 ^8c0dc6cf62a0ef1b5c6eabd1b67ba69866adf16a
Netscreen-08 ^92d27a9ecb31d99246986d3453d0c3d57a222a61
Netscreen-09 ^9b096d9ac3275a7d6fe8b91c583111b09efed1a0
Netscreen-10 ^bf03746108d746c904f1f3547de24f78479fed12
Netscreen-11 ^c2e80500f4cc5fbf5daaeed3bb59abaeee56c652
Netscreen-12 ^c8660a62b03b1b6130bf781608d32a6a8d0fb89f
Netscreen-13 ^f885da40b1e7a9abd17655ec5bbec0f21f0ed52e
Netscreen-14 ^2a2bcac19b8e91b426107807e02e7249569d6fd3
Netscreen-15 ^166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd8451
Netscreen-16 ^a35bfd05ca1ac0b3d2f24e9e82bfcbff9c9e52b5
# Avaya
# Observed on Avaya VSU 100R
# Not sure if this is common to all Avaya equipment
avaya ^4485152d18b6bbcc0be8a8469579ddcc
# Stonegate
# Observed on Stonesoft StoneGate v2.2.1
StoneGate-01 ^c573b056d7faca36c2fba28374127cbf
StoneGate-02 ^baeb239037e17787d730eed9d95d48aa
# Symantec Raptor / Enterprise Firewall
# Observed on Symantec Enterprise Firewall 8.0 running on Windows 2000
# An example vendor ID returned by these systems is:
# 526170746f7220506f77657256706e20536572766572205b56382e315d
# which corresponds to the ASCII string: "Raptor PowerVpn Server [V8.1]"
#
Symantec-Raptor-v8.1 ^526170746f7220506f77657256706e20536572766572205b56382e315d
Symantec-Raptor ^526170746f7220506f77657256706e20536572766572
# Other things I've seen but not fully classified yet.
# If anyone can confirm any of these, please let me know.
Maybe Cisco IOS ^bdb41038a7ec5e5534dd004d0f91f927
# Unknown 1 was classified as Cisco VPN Concentrator
# Unknown 2 was classified as Windows-2000
Unknown 3 ^edea53a3c15d45cafb11e59ea68db2aa99c1470e0000000400000303
Unknown 4 ^bedc86dabf0ab7973870b5e6c4b87d3ee824de310000001000000401
Unknown 5 ^ac5078c25cabb9523979978e76a3d0d2426bc9260000000400000401
# Unknown 6 was classified as SSH IPSEC Express 4.1.0
Unknown 7 ^69b761a173cc1471dc4547d2a5e94812
Unknown 8 ^4c5647362e303a627269636b3a362e302e353732
Unknown 9 ^3499691eb82f9eaefed378f5503671debd0663b4000000040000023c
# I've seen Unknown 10 sent from SonicWall Global VPN Client
Unknown 10 ^975b7816f69789600dda89040576e0db
# The "Safenet or Watchguard" Vendor ID has also been seen sent from SonicWall
# Global VPN client. It is normally followed by 80010000, which looks like a
# version number.
Safenet or Watchguard ^da8e9378
Unknown-cisco ^e23ae9f51a46876ff93d89ba725d649d
Maybe Sidewinder G2 ^8404adf9cda05760b2ca292e4bff537b
Maybe Sidewinder G2 ^e720cdd49d2ee7b83ce1970a6c69b528
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-3.40282346638528861e+38
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/_pages/
/_pages/_demo/_ojspext/_events/_index.java
/admin/
/admin_/
/adminoc4j
/assistants/
/backup_restore/
/bc4j.html
/BC4J/
/bc4jdoc/setup.html
/bmp/
/bmp/global-web-application.xml
/bmp/JSPClient.java
/bmp/mime.types
/bmp/README.txt
/bmp/setconn.jsp
/bmp/SqljConnBeanDemo.jsp
/bmp/SqljConnBeanDemo.jsp.txt
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/cgi-bin/printenv
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/content/index.jspx
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/dav_public
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/demo/
/demo/basic/hellouser/hellouser.jsp
/demo/basic/hellouser/synopsis.htm
/demo/basic/index.html
/demo/basic/info/info.jsp
/demo/basic/info/synopsis.htm
/demo/basic/jspstore/index.jsp
/demo/basic/jspstore/synopsis.htm
/demo/basic/lottery/lotto.jsp
/demo/basic/lottery/synopsis.htm
/demo/basic/simple/index.html
/demo/corba/CallCORBA.jsp
/demo/corba/index.html
/demo/corba/viewsrc/CallCORBA.jsp.txt
/demo/corba/viewsrc/HelloCorbaWrapperBean.java.txt
/demo/customtag/exampletag.jsp
/demo/customtag/index.htm
/demo/customtag/viewsrc/ExampleLoopTag.java.txt
/demo/customtag/viewsrc/ExampleLoopTagTEI.java.txt
/demo/customtag/viewsrc/exampletag.jsp.txt
/demo/customtag/viewsrc/exampletag.tld.txt
/demo/ejb/CallEJB.jsp
/demo/ejb/index.html
/demo/ejb/viewsrc/CallEJB.jsp.txt
/demo/ejb/viewsrc/EmployeeEJBWrapper.java.txt
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/demo/ojspext/index.html
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/demo/ojspext/jspscope/scope.jsp
/demo/ojspext/jspscope/synopsis.htm
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/demo/sql/bean/CursorBeanDemo.jsp
/demo/sql/bean/DBBeanDemo.jsp
/demo/sql/bean/viewsrc/ConnBeanDemo.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/bean/viewsrc/ConnCacheBeanDemo.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/bean/viewsrc/CursorBeanDemo.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/bean/viewsrc/DBBeanDemo.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/index.jsp
/demo/sql/jdbc/ConnCache1.jsp
/demo/sql/jdbc/ConnCache2.jsp
/demo/sql/jdbc/ConnCache3.jsp
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/demo/sql/jdbc/SimpleQuery.jsp
/demo/sql/jdbc/UseHtmlQueryBean.jsp
/demo/sql/jdbc/viewsrc/ConnCache1.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/jdbc/viewsrc/ConnCache2.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/jdbc/viewsrc/ConnCache3.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/jdbc/viewsrc/JDBCQuery.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/jdbc/viewsrc/setupcache.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/jdbc/viewsrc/SimpleQuery.jsp.txt
/demo/sql/jdbc/viewsrc/UseHtmlQueryBean.jsp.txt
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/demo/sql/sqlj/SQLJSelectInto.sqljsp