Move CI image pull tokens to a short-lived, revocable credential
## Context
This issue is one of two AppSec follow-ups on the P0 GA capability that lets a CI job pull Artifact Registry images in `image:` and `services:` with no `DOCKER_AUTH_CONFIG`, part of the GA epic https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/22707 and tracked in https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/630573. The monolith/S16 spec, added by https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440, specifies how: GitLab adds a `registry` credential for the Artifact Registry host to the job payload, carrying an ADR-020 token that GitLab issues in process for the job's user. The runner pulls those images before any job script runs, and the pull can start long after GitLab issues the token, so the token expires at the job's start plus its timeout, at most 12 hours after issue. Nothing can revoke it before then. AppSec [accepted this as an interim](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440#note_4080433645): its guidance for a token that cannot be revoked is 15 minutes at most, and the same problem exists for trigger and AutoFlow, where a generalized mechanism for authorization data is planned. Product [confirmed the prioritization](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440#note_4103889688). A [review note from 2026-11-02](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440#note_4142721650) reports that the Kubernetes executor also writes the token into a `kubernetes.io/dockercfg` Secret in the build namespace, where anyone who can read Secrets there can copy it while the job runs. A job script can exchange `CI_JOB_TOKEN` again whenever a short token expires, as https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1269 notes for the P1 capability in https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/634993. The pre-job pull holds only the payload credential and cannot exchange again, which is why this surface waits on the mechanism.
## What exists on main
Each line holds at `5102ec28a` (`5102ec28a23e95c5d29ad34e055bae1956103377`, 2026-11-02).
- `docs/specs/README.md`: the monolith index ends at S15, and a bare `S16` is the Go-service container remote spec, `docs/specs/S16-container-remote.md`. The original description's S16 is monolith/S16, `docs/specs/monolith/S16-ci-job-image-pull-credentials.md`, which reaches main when https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440 merges.
- `docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md`, Token issuance (R1): tokens default to 5 minutes and cap at 12 hours. Its in-process issuance item lets Rails issue the token for the registry credential in a CI job payload, no longer than the job's timeout, and says these surfaces move into the IAM STS with the rest of issuance.
- `docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md`, Architectural constraint: the Artifact Registry never calls back to the GitLab instance while it serves a request, so everything it needs to verify a token is in the token or already cached.
- `docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md`, Consequences, Negative: issued tokens cannot be revoked before expiry, because validation is local with no callback or blocklist.
- `docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md`, Artifact Registry to the relationships API: the Artifact Registry forwards the client's token unchanged to the relationships API, which verifies it again.
- `docs/adr/021_authorization.md`, Role assignment: the Artifact Registry caches relationships API answers for 30 seconds by default and 60 at most, so a removed role assignment stops a copied token's access only after that window plus the relationships API's unmeasured lag. The token itself stays valid.
- `internal/auth/tokenexchange/verifier.go`: checks a token's signature, issuer, audience, and expiry against keys fetched once at startup, for one configured issuer and its configured audiences. `git grep -n -i -E 'revok|revoc|blocklist' 5102ec28a -- internal/auth/` and `git grep -n -i -w jti 5102ec28a -- internal/` return nothing, so the verifier reads no revocation state.
- `internal/auth/handler_token.go`: `GET /v2/auth/token` validates the Basic password with that verifier and returns the same credential as `token` and `access_token`, with `expires_in` fixed at 86400. A Docker pull's bearer token is the payload token itself.
- `internal/auth/middleware.go`: every request the dispatch table matches, a pull's manifest and blob requests included, validates its credential with the same verifier, so a request after the token's `exp` gets `401`. `iam.SetToken` keeps the token for forwarding to the relationships API.
- `docs/specs/S08-authentication.md`, `/v2/auth/token`: specifies that round trip, written for the bootstrap token.
- `docs/testing/e2e/docker.md`: `e2e.docker.auth.ci-job-token` covers a job script that exchanges `CI_JOB_TOKEN` and pushes. No row covers the pre-job pull, and monolith/S16 names `e2e.docker.auth.ci-image-pull` and `e2e.docker.auth.ci-image-pull-denied` as candidates.
## Change
The Artifact Registry credential that monolith/S16 adds to the CI job payload moves from a job-bounded ADR-020 token onto the generalized mechanism for authorization data. No credential the runner holds for the Artifact Registry host stays usable longer than AppSec's 15-minute guidance unless it can be revoked, and a pre-job pull that starts late or runs long still succeeds, as monolith/S16 requires. The amended monolith/S16 records the mechanism, its revocation rules, and AppSec's sign-off in place of the interim lifetime.
## Acceptance criteria
1. **No long-lived token that cannot be revoked (original description).** Every token in the job payload's Artifact Registry credential either expires at most 15 minutes after GitLab issues it or can be revoked under the rules criterion 4 asks for. AppSec's guidance for a token that cannot be revoked is 15 minutes at most. The provider spec asserts each token's lifetime.
1. **A late pull still succeeds (original description).** A job whose pre-job pull of an Artifact Registry image in `image:` or `services:` starts more than 15 minutes after GitLab builds its payload, as when an autoscaler acquires an instance or docker+machine creates a VM, pulls the image and runs its script with no `DOCKER_AUTH_CONFIG`. Resolution 1 of monolith/S16 names those delays.
1. **A long pull still completes (monolith/S16 Resolution 1 and Error cases).** A pre-job pull that runs longer than 15 minutes completes, and an expired credential fails a pull no earlier than the interim token does: past the job's timeout or 12 hours after issue. On main the pull's bearer token is the payload token itself, so with a payload token of 15 minutes or less this criterion needs a change to how the pull gets its bearer token, and the mechanism's design decides which component makes it.
1. **Revocation rules (decision for the monolith/S16 owner and AppSec).** Neither monolith/S16 nor ADR-020 defines revocation for this credential, so if the mechanism's credential lives longer than 15 minutes, the amendment states which events revoke it, who can trigger them, and how long after one a revoked credential still starts or continues a pull. On main the Artifact Registry cannot refuse a valid token before its `exp`: it verifies locally, ADR-020's architectural constraint rules out calling GitLab while it serves a request, and the verifier reads no revocation state.
1. **Older runners (decision for the monolith/S16 owner).** The monolith/S16 credential needs no runner release, because runners that predate it apply a payload credential of type `registry` to a matching image host. The amendment states whether the mechanism keeps that, or names the minimum runner version and what a job on an older runner gets. https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/630573 asks the same question under Open questions.
1. **The Artifact Registry accepts the new token before GitLab issues it.** If the mechanism's token carries an issuer or audience that a deployed Artifact Registry does not trust, `GET /v2/auth/token` on every Artifact Registry deployment answers `200` for it, and the relationships API accepts it when forwarded, before any job payload carries it. The verifier accepts one configured issuer and its configured audiences, and https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1691 records the same deploy order for a new audience.
1. **The rest of monolith/S16 still holds.** Its acceptance criteria 4 to 8 still pass with the new credential: the counter, the five conditions, the job request that survives an issuer error, and the scenarios `e2e.docker.auth.ci-image-pull` and `e2e.docker.auth.ci-image-pull-denied`. Its criteria 1 to 3 describe today's token, and the amendment restates them for the new one.
## Specs and ADRs
- monolith/S16, `docs/specs/monolith/S16-ci-job-image-pull-credentials.md` in https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440: Job payload credential, Compatibility (multi-version), Acceptance criteria, Error cases, Security considerations, Follow-ups, and Resolution 1 (Lifetime) hold the interim this issue replaces.
- [ADR-020 Token issuance (R1)](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md#token-issuance-r1): lifetime bounds and in-process issuance for the CI job payload.
- [ADR-020 Architectural constraint](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md#architectural-constraint): no callback to GitLab while the Artifact Registry serves a request.
- [ADR-020 Consequences, Negative](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md#negative): issued tokens cannot be revoked before expiry.
- [ADR-020 Artifact Registry to the relationships API](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md#artifact-registry-to-the-relationships-api): the Artifact Registry forwards the token unchanged to the relationships API.
- [ADR-021 Role assignment](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/021_authorization.md#role-assignment): the cache window that delays a removed role assignment.
- [S08 `/v2/auth/token`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S08-authentication.md#v2authtoken): the token endpoint the pre-job pull calls.
## Dependencies
- https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440, the monolith/S16 spec: this issue amends the spec that MR adds, so the amendment opens after it merges.
- https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3676, the monolith/S16 plan: its Step 1 builds the credential in `gitlab-org/gitlab`, and its description leaves this issue outside the plan. This issue's code MR changes what Step 1 builds, so it lands after Step 1.
- The generalized mechanism for authorization data has no issue to link. A search of `gitlab-org` issues on 2026-11-02 under several wordings found none, and the [author's request for it](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440#note_4105909640) had no reply on the MR that day. The closest public item, https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cluster-integration/gitlab-agent/-/work_items/1193, plans tokens that the trigger service and AutoFlow mint per workflow and per action attempt, and it names no CI job or registry surface. Every step here waits on the mechanism's issue, because the amendment cannot name a credential that no issue defines.
- https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1691, the read-only scope or dedicated audience for the same token: no order. Both amend monolith/S16 and change the token its credential carries, so the second amendment rebases onto the first, and a new audience from either follows the deploy order that issue records.
- https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/229, the organization-configurable lifetime ceiling: no order. The monolith/S16 Follow-ups say the ceiling must also reach the CI job token, so whichever lands second applies it to the credential it finds.
- https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/634993 and https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1269, a token for job scripts with no exchange step: no order. The `gitlab-org/gitlab` item's first open question asks whether GitLab issues the token with the job, and a mechanism that serves both surfaces answers it for both.
## First step
Before any MR, the generalized mechanism's issue is linked here. Once it is and https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440 has merged, the monolith/S16 owner opens a `docs(specs)` MR that puts the mechanism's credential in place of the job-bounded lifetime in Job payload credential, Error cases, Security considerations, and Resolution 1, adds criteria 1 to 3 above to the spec's Acceptance criteria, and records the rulings criteria 4 and 5 ask for, with AppSec's sign-off on the lifetime and revocation rules. A plan and the `gitlab-org/gitlab` step MRs follow, after Step 1 of the monolith/S16 plan.
## Original description
## Problem
The CI job image pull credential in S16 (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440) carries an ADR-020 token so the runner can pull `image:` and `services:` images before the job script runs. The token cannot be revoked, and it lives until the job's timeout, capped at 12 hours.
AppSec [accepted this as an interim](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440#note_4080433645): a non-revocable token should live 15 minutes at most. The same problem exists for trigger and AutoFlow, where a generalized mechanism for authorization data is planned. Product [confirmed the prioritization](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/merge_requests/3440#note_4103889688).
## Proposal
Once the generalized mechanism exists, move the CI image pull credential onto it, so a pull no longer depends on a long-lived token that cannot be revoked. Link the mechanism's issue here when there is one.
## Acceptance
- The CI image pull credential carries no non-revocable token that lives longer than AppSec's guidance.
- A pull still succeeds when it starts long after the job is picked up, as S16 requires today.
Related: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1691 (read-only scope), https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/630573
issue
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