Public read for remote and virtual container repositories: the AR backend work behind the anonymous pull decision
## Context
Anonymous and public pull is a P1 capability of the GA epic https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/22707. Its product model is in https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/605689: a per-repository, revocable grant that only an Artifact Admin or Artifact Manager can set, read only, unavailable where the instance restricts `Public`, and all-or-nothing on a virtual repository. The gap blocks two Beta users. Virtual registries required authentication even in a public group, and Kubernetes and CI consumers of mirrored public registries cannot carry credentials per group. One called the per-group `DOCKER_AUTH_CONFIG` workaround a massive step down from Harbor (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/589630#note_3305652239). This issue covers the Artifact Registry backend for container remote and virtual repositories.
## What exists on main
Read at `f771c7325`.
- `docs/adr/021_authorization.md`, Repository visibility and Public and internal visibility: closed beta supports `private` only. `public` and `internal` wait for GA because ADR-021 leaves open how to grant broad read while staying closed-by-default. Write and management operations need a role regardless of visibility.
- `docs/specs/S09-authorization.md`, Data Model and Anonymous callers: no S09 decision path consults `repositories.visibility`. `Assembly` denies an anonymous caller on a matched route with the masked `404` before resolving the repository.
- `internal/authz/middleware.go`, `Assembly.authorize`: the gate precedes `resolveTarget`, which never runs for an anonymous caller.
- `internal/authz/decision.go`, `evaluate`: builds `glaz.CheckRequest` without `Attributes`, as every production caller does. `internal/authz/glaz/checker.go` documents that field as carrying the resource visibility, beside a host-synthesized anonymous tuple for public-repository access.
- `internal/auth/middleware.go` and `internal/auth/handler_token.go`: a `/v2/` request without a credential gets `401` and a Bearer challenge. `/v2/auth/token` answers `401` without a Basic credential. An anonymous pull stops there. The anonymous identity S09's gate tests comes only from a validator that matches a token and names no caller (`internal/auth/bootstrap` and `internal/auth/devmode`).
- `docs/specs/S08-authentication.md`, Out of Scope: lists anonymous or public reads.
- `docs/specs/S12-container-oci-hosted.md`, Authentication and Authorization: every endpoint except `GET /v2/` requires a valid Bearer token.
- `internal/format/oci/handler.go`, `serveByRepositoryKind`: hands an allowed request to the remote or virtual read arm. No non-test file under `internal/format/oci`, `internal/remote`, or `internal/virtual` imports `internal/authz`, so the `Assembly` verdict on the addressed repository is a read's only access check.
- `docs/specs/S13-virtual-remote-foundation.md`, Resolutions (Local-upstream visibility): S13 authorizes a virtual read on the addressed repository, with no per-upstream check. Its behavioral columns table defines the container-only `auth_status` (`0=unknown`, `1=none`, `2=bearer`).
- `docs/specs/S16-container-remote.md`, Auth-challenge and token-exchange: discovery runs on a cache miss while `auth_status` is `unknown`. A remote with no stored credential pulls a `bearer` upstream through an anonymous token exchange. Its Follow-ups record that one verdict per remote misreports one class of images when an upstream serves public and private images from one host.
- `docs/specs/S17-rest-management-api.md`, Virtual upstream associations (Phase 6): checks a new association for namespace, kind, format family, duplicates, and the 20-entry cap. A whole-list write re-checks no entry it keeps. `PATCH` accepts `visibility` on every kind under `update_repository`. A remote's detail carries the read-only `has_credentials`.
- `docs/specs/S32-container-virtual.md`, Security Considerations and Open Questions: a public virtual repository over a private hosted upstream serves that upstream to every reader of the virtual repository. Whether S17 refuses an upstream less visible than its virtual repository is open for the S17 and S13 DRIs. Tag listing caps open merge sessions at 10 per subject and 100 per virtual repository. `caller_fingerprint` hashes every anonymous caller to one subject.
- `internal/managementapi/create.go`: defaults an omitted `visibility` to `private` and persists a requested `public` or `internal` (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1055). In `internal/datastore/repositories.go`, `RepositoryVisibilityPublic` is `0`, the Go zero value. `internal/datastore/migrations/structure.sql` carries `index_repositories_on_namespace_id_and_visibility` over active rows, the index ADR-007's public-repository audit query uses.
- `internal/format/npm/download.go` and `internal/format/npm/disttags.go`: npm is the only format whose responses vary on the column. A public repository's tarball carries `public, max-age=31536000, immutable`.
- `docs/dev/configuration-reference.md`: a Cloud CDN signed URL lives for `signed_url_expiry`, default `20m`.
- `docs/testing/e2e/limitations.md`, "A visibility flip is accepted and no container route reads the value": blocks `e2e.oci.setup.update-visibility` and `e2e.docker.setup.update-visibility` and names this issue as what lifts it. `docs/testing/e2e/oci.md` and `docs/testing/e2e/docker.md` carry one anonymous row each, `*.auth.anonymous-denied`.
- `docs/adr/004_data_and_application_limits.md`, Rate Limits: layers IP, per-user, and per-namespace limits and runs them in logging mode on GitLab.com before enforcing them. No request rate limiter exists under `internal/` or `cmd/`.
## Change
Anonymous callers can pull from a container remote or virtual repository that carries the grant, and from a hosted one if decision 1 includes hosted. Anonymous writes and management calls stay denied everywhere. On main an anonymous pull stops at authentication, and S08 lists anonymous reads as out of scope. Changing S09 alone opens nothing. The work is the ADR-021 amendment for the grant, then S08 (admit an anonymous read on the container routes), S09 (the anonymous path resolves the repository and consults the grant for read actions only), S17 (the virtual all-or-nothing guard on grant and association writes), and the container read responses (anonymous and authenticated reads never share a cache entry). It also covers rate limits for anonymous callers and the instance's restricted visibility levels. npm and Maven public read, also in the GA issue, are out of scope.
## Acceptance criteria
Criteria 1 to 6 are decisions the specs on main leave open. Criteria 7 to 14 hold under every resolution.
1. **Hosted coverage (product owner, the GA issue's open decision 1).** https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/605689 records whether the grant covers hosted repositories. (a) Remote and virtual only: the hosted read routes stay closed, and the GA issue's hosted-repository criterion leaves GA. No hosted member can qualify, so a granted virtual repository lists remote members only. The Beta reports above need only (a). (b) Hosted too: S12's token requirement changes, the grant reaches content the organization publishes, and a hosted member qualifies once granted.
1. **Credential-free remotes (product owner with the S16 and S17 DRIs, the GA issue's open decision 4).** The GA issue records how the registry learns, before the first pull, that a remote's upstream needs no credentials. The original description names `auth_status` as today's signal, but `auth_status` records whether the upstream needs a token exchange: a credential-free remote behind an anonymous exchange reads `bearer`. (a) Stored credentials: a remote qualifies while `has_credentials` is false. The flag exists from create on, with no upstream contact. It matches the GA rule's reason, that the registry fetches licensed content with credentials, and the guard re-runs on every settings write that stores credentials. It cannot see an upstream that restricts content by the registry's source address. (b) The discovery verdict: `auth_status` reads `unknown` until the first cache miss. One verdict per remote misreports one class of images when an upstream serves public and private images from one host (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/543). The evidence on main favors (a), the only signal that exists before the first pull.
1. **What carries the grant (the ADR-021 amendment).** Both GA issues define the grant apart from visibility levels. https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/630572, whose signed-in-users grant shares the mechanism, says not to build a public, internal, and private switch. (a) `repositories.visibility = public`, the switch S17 already accepts on create and `PATCH`: no schema change, and the partial index serves an audit of public rows. Every row already stored as `public` turns world-readable once a read path consults the column (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1055). A `CreateRepositoryInput` that leaves `Visibility` unset also creates a granted row. (b) A separate per-repository grant that names its audience, anyone here and signed-in users for the internal grant. It needs a migration and a new S17 field, leaves the stored `visibility` values unconsulted, and makes S17 say what `visibility` still controls. The GA issues favor (b).
1. **Members that stop qualifying (product owner, a gap in the GA issue and S17).** The GA rule refuses a non-qualifying member at association. It says nothing of a standing member that stops qualifying: a hosted member whose grant is cleared, or a remote member that gains credentials through a settings write. S17's whole-list write re-checks no entry it keeps either. (a) Refuse the member's change with `422` while a granted virtual repository lists it. (b) Clear the virtual repository's grant in the same transaction, which turns an edit to one repository into an access change on another. (c) Allow the change, the outcome if no spec rules on it, which leaves the virtual repository serving that member to anonymous callers. The GA rule's choice to fail with an error favors (a).
1. **Whether the grant waits for anonymous rate limits (product owner, the GA issue's open decision 3).** Per-user limits do not apply to an anonymous caller. Egress bills the publishing organization at $0.10/GB. No request rate limiter exists on main, and ADR-004 enforces on GitLab.com only after a logging phase. The anonymous key is for https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1181 to define. (a) The grant waits until that key enforces, so anonymous egress is bounded from the first pull. (b) The grant ships first, and nothing bounds an organization's anonymous egress until Enforce. Either way, S32's 10-session cap per subject puts every anonymous caller of one granted virtual repository behind one cap, so S32 has to say what an anonymous caller counts as.
1. **What "immediately" means for revocation (product owner).** The GA issue requires revoking the grant to stop anonymous reads immediately. The registry can refuse the next request. A blob redirect issued before the revocation carries a signed CDN URL valid for `signed_url_expiry`, default `20m`. Any shared-cacheable `Cache-Control` on a granted response adds its `max-age`. (a) The bound is the signed URL lifetime, and granted container responses carry no shared-cacheable directive. (b) A shorter bound, which needs a shorter signed URL lifetime or proxy delivery for anonymous blob reads. Proxy delivery moves those bytes through the registry.
1. **Anonymous writes are refused.** The registry refuses an anonymous push, blob upload, tag write, or delete against any container repository, granted or not, and any anonymous management API request. ADR-021 requires a role for every write and management operation regardless of visibility.
1. **Granted repositories serve anonymous reads.** With the grant on a container remote or virtual repository, and on a hosted one under decision 1 (b), `docker pull` by tag and by digest succeeds with no stored credentials. Its manifest, blob, tag-list, and referrers reads return the content an authenticated reader receives.
1. **Everything else stays closed.** The registry refuses an anonymous read of a container repository without the grant, including one whose grant was cleared once decision 6's bound has passed. Nothing in the response tells it from an absent repository. `e2e.oci.auth.anonymous-denied` and `e2e.docker.auth.anonymous-denied` keep passing. An anonymous read on the Maven and npm surfaces answers as it does on main.
1. **The virtual rule holds.** Setting the grant on a virtual repository, or associating an upstream with a granted one, answers `422` naming the rule when any member fails decision 2's test or, for a hosted member, lacks the grant. A granted virtual repository never serves a subset of its members to anonymous callers. This follows the GA issue's recommendation on its open decision 2, all-or-nothing over per-caller filtering. It answers S32's less-visible-upstream question for granted virtual repositories.
1. **Only Artifact Manager and Artifact Admin set the grant.** Setting or clearing it requires `update_repository`, which ADR-021 gives those two roles alone. S09's denial mapping refuses an Artifact Viewer or Artifact Contributor.
1. **The instance's restricted visibility levels apply.** On a GitLab Self-Managed or Dedicated instance whose administrator restricts `Public` visibility, the registry refuses a request that sets the grant. ADR-021 bars a call to the instance during request processing, and S33 carries no visibility setting. The spec change for this criterion therefore names the channel that delivers the setting.
1. **Anonymous and authenticated reads never share a cache entry.** An anonymous read never receives an authenticated read's cached response for the same `/v2/` URL, or the reverse. The blob redirect carries `Vary: Authorization` before any change adds `Cache-Control` to it (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1084).
1. **Scenarios and user docs move with the change.** `e2e.oci.setup.update-visibility` and `e2e.docker.setup.update-visibility` leave `blocked`. The catalogs assert them as written under decision 3 (a) or rewrite them to the grant's field under (b), and `docs/testing/e2e/limitations.md` drops the entry that blocks them. `docs/testing/e2e/oci.md` and `docs/testing/e2e/docker.md` gain anonymous pull rows for remote and virtual repositories. `## Visibility` in `docs/user/_index.md` and `docs/user/repositories/_index.md` describes the grant, who sets it, and the virtual rule.
## Specs and ADRs
- ADR-021, Public and internal visibility, the deferral the amendment lifts: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/021_authorization.md#public-and-internal-visibility
- ADR-021, Repository visibility, the closed-by-default rule: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/021_authorization.md#repository-visibility
- ADR-020, Authentication flow, the token an anonymous pull lacks: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/020_authentication_flow.md#authentication-flow
- ADR-004, Rate Limits: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/004_data_and_application_limits.md#rate-limits
- ADR-007, Repositories, the `visibility` codes and the public-repository audit query: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/adr/007_database_schema.md#repositories
- S08, Out of Scope: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S08-authentication.md#out-of-scope
- S09, Anonymous callers: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S09-authorization.md#anonymous-callers
- S12, Authentication and Authorization, under decision 1 (b) only: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S12-container-oci-hosted.md#authentication-and-authorization
- S13, Resolutions (Local-upstream visibility): https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S13-virtual-remote-foundation.md#resolutions
- S16, Auth-challenge and token-exchange: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S16-container-remote.md#auth-challenge-and-token-exchange
- S17, Virtual upstream associations (Phase 6): https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S17-rest-management-api.md#virtual-upstream-associations-phase-6
- S32, Security Considerations: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S32-container-virtual.md#security-considerations
- S32, Open Questions: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/blob/main/docs/specs/S32-container-virtual.md#open-questions
## Dependencies
- First, https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/605689: decisions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 are its product owner's, and the ADR-021 amendment writes their answers.
- With decision 3, https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/630572: its signed-in-users grant uses the same mechanism, so one representation serves both.
- Before the read path consults the grant, https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/707, whose event also covers the grant's field under decision 3 (b): the first grant that opens a repository to anonymous callers then has an audit event naming who set it.
- Before a read path consults `repositories.visibility`, https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1055: every row already stored as `public` turns world-readable at that moment. The order lapses under decision 3 (b).
- Before any granted container response gains a `Cache-Control` directive, https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1084: until it lands, the blob redirect carries no `Vary`.
- Ordered by decision 5, https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/1181: it defines the anonymous rate-limit key under the GA issue https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/605697.
- Only under decision 2 (b), https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry/-/work_items/543: until it lands, one verdict per remote misreports one class of images on a mixed-visibility upstream.
## First step
First, the product owner answers decisions 1, 2, and 4 on https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/605689. The first MR then carries those answers into the ADR-021 amendment in the handbook repository, which `docs/adr/` mirrors. It also settles decision 3 for this grant and the signed-in-users grant. The S08, S09, and S17 amendments and the plan MR follow it.
## Original description
## Why
Two Beta users blocked on this. Virtual registries required authentication even in a public group, and Kubernetes and CI consumers of mirrored public registries cannot carry credentials per group ([note](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/589630#note_3305652239), [note](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/589630#note_3518528497)). One called the per-group `DOCKER_AUTH_CONFIG` workaround a massive step down from Harbor. The product model, a per-repository revocable grant with an all-or-nothing rule for virtual repositories, is in gitlab-org/gitlab#605689+s.
AR today: ADR-021 defers `public` and `internal` to GA with the mechanism undecided, S09 denies every anonymous request with a masked `404` before resolving the repository, and create already persists `visibility: public` without enforcing it (gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry#1055+s).
## Backend work
- ADR-021 amendment for the grant, then S09: the anonymous path resolves the repository and consults visibility for reads only. Writes stay denied for anonymous callers everywhere.
- S17 association guard for a public virtual repository: every member qualifies or the association fails with `422`. A remote qualifies when its upstream needs no credentials, which today is a lazily discovered `auth_status`, so the guard needs a decision on how it learns that ahead of the first pull.
- Cache keys and CDN: anonymous and authenticated reads must not share a cached redirect (gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry#1084+s).
- Rate limiting for callers with no principal, so a popular public repository cannot run up the owning organization's egress unbounded (gitlab-org/gitlab#605697+s).
- Honor the instance's restricted visibility levels on self-managed and Dedicated.
- Unblock `e2e.oci.setup.update-visibility` and add anonymous pull rows for remote and virtual repositories.
## Related
- gitlab-org/ops/artifact-registry#707+s
issue
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