Assess validity checks parity with secret-detection-rules
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## Goal
Goal of this issue is to assess the parity between validity checks and the default ruleset in [secret-detection-rules](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/security-products/secret-detection/secret-detection-rules).
For every detection rule:
- Either a validity check exists.
- One can be built.
- Or there is a recorded reason it cannot.
## Legend
| Class | Sub-class | Meaning | Rules |
| -------------- | --------- | ------- | ----- |
| done | – | A validity check already exists for the rule. | 38 |
| viable | – | A validity check can be generated for this rule. | 24 |
| not-verifiable | – | The value is not verifiable, e.g. private keys, OAuth client IDs, webhooks, or a refresh token. | 36 |
| needs-rework | – | A validity check is possible, but something must change first: | 119 |
| | Rule change | The rule captures the wrong value, so the finding extract cannot be verified until the rule is fixed. | 8 |
| | Region-split hosts | The endpoint depends on the customer's host region, so a live token can look dead on the wrong host. | 8 |
| | Generator change | One credential and a fixed endpoint, but the request needs a generator feature that does not exist yet. | 16 |
| | Code change | The check needs changes to the code, e.g. in `TokenLookupService` to lookup token across two models. | 6 |
| | Hand-written client | The response is not expressible as a status-code mapping. | 3 |
| | Parked | The HTTP status does not tell a live token from a dead one, so the check needs a hand-written client. | 5 |
| | Multi-token validation | The detected value only authenticates together with a second component that is not detected. | 40 |
| | Per-customer endpoint | The token only works against a host that cannot be derived from the detected secret. | 33 |
## Classifications
Totals: Done (38), Viable (24), Needs Rework (119), Not Verifiable (36).
Below are the classifications we have arrived at so far.
### Done (38)
Partners and External Vendors (25)
- `AWS`
- `anthropic_key`
- `DataDogAPIKey`
- `GCP API key`
- `GCP OAuth client secret`
- `Google (GCP) Service-account`
- `Github Personal Access Token`
- `GithubFineGrainedPersonalAccessToken`
- `Github OAuth Access Token`
- `GithubAppInstallationToken`
- `Heroku API Key`
- `open ai token`
- `OpenAiProjectKey`
- `OpenAiServiceAccountKey`
- `OpenAiServiceAdminKey`
- `Postman API token`
- `Sendgrid API token`
- `StripeLiveSecretKey`
- `StripeLiveRestrictedKey`
- `StripeLivePublishableKey`
- `StripeLiveShortSecretKey`
- `StripeTestSecretKey`
- `StripeTestRestrictedKey`
- `StripeTestPublishableKey`
- `StripeTestShortSecretKey`
GitLab Tokens (13)
- `gitlab_ci_build_token`
- `gitlab_deploy_token`
- `gitlab_feed_token_v2`
- `gitlab_incoming_email_token`
- `gitlab_kubernetes_agent_token`
- `gitlab_oauth_app_secret`
- `gitlab_personal_access_token`
- `gitlab_personal_access_token_routable`
- `gitlab_personal_access_token_routable_versioned`
- `gitlab_pipeline_trigger_token`
- `gitlab_runner_auth_token`
- `gitlab_runner_auth_token_routable`
- `gitlab_scim_oauth_token`
### Viable (24)
| Rule | Endpoint | Invalid code (tested) |
| ---- | -------- | --------------------- |
| `npm access token`<br>!258832 DONE :white_check_mark: | `registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami` | 401 |
| `AdafruitIOKey`<br>!260856 DONE :white_check_mark: | `io.adafruit.com/api/v2/user` | 401 |
| `AsanaPersonalAccessTokenV1`<br>!260857 DONE :white_check_mark: | `app.asana.com/api/1.0/users/me` | 401 |
| `AsanaPersonalAccessTokenV2`<br>!260857 DONE :white_check_mark: | `app.asana.com/api/1.0/users/me` | 401 |
| `AtlassianApiKey` | `api.atlassian.com/admin/v1/orgs` | 401 |
| `Beamer API token`<br>!260861 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.getbeamer.com/v0/posts` | 401 |
| `CDSCanadaNotifyAPIKey`<br>!260874 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.notification.canada.ca/notifications` | 403 (send full match as `Authorization` header, i.e. `auth_style: header`) |
| `ContentfulPersonalAccessToken` | `api.contentful.com/spaces` | 401 (confirm EU-residency orgs authenticate here) |
| `digitalocean-access-token`<br>!260865 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.digitalocean.com/v2/account` | 401 |
| `digitalocean-pat`<br>!260865 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.digitalocean.com/v2/account` | 401 |
| `Doppler API token`<br>!260867 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.doppler.com/v3/me` | 401 |
| `Doppler Service token`<br>!260867 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.doppler.com/v3/me` | 401 |
| `Fastly API token`<br>!260870 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.fastly.com/tokens/self` | 401 |
| `Flutterwave secret key`<br>!260872 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.flutterwave.com/v3/balances` | 401 |
| `FlutterwaveProdSecretKey`<br>!260872 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.flutterwave.com/v3/balances` | 401 |
| `Frame.io API token` | `api.frame.io/v2/me` | 401 |
| `Hubspot API token`<br>!260877 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.hubapi.com/crm/v3/objects/contacts` | 401 |
| `HuggingFaceUserAccessToken`<br>!260884 DONE :white_check_mark: | `huggingface.co/api/whoami-v2` | 401 |
| `Ionic API token` | `api.ionicjs.com/users/self` | 401 |
| `Lob API Key` | `api.lob.com/v1/addresses` (basic, key as username) | 401 |
| `Rubygem API token` | `rubygems.org/api/v1/profile/me.json` (`api_key.yaml` from older docs is 410 Gone) | 401 |
| `TailscaleApiAccessToken`<br>!260886 DONE :white_check_mark: | `api.tailscale.com/api/v2/tailnet/-/devices` (basic, key as username) | 401 |
| `WakaTimeAPIKey` | `wakatime.com/api/v1/users/current` (basic, key as username) | – |
| `Sendinblue API token` | `api.brevo.com/v3/account` | 401 |
## Needs Rework (119)
### Rule Change (8)
> The detection rule needs fixing before any validity check makes sense. Endpoint notes apply after the fix.
- `Duffel API token` – capture group reports only `test` or `live` as the secret; API also requires a fixed version header
- `Slack token` – capture-group fix upstream (secret-detection-rules!219; needs [rule change policy](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/629010) finalized first)
- `CircleCI access tokens` – one rule spans `CCIPAT_` and `CCIPRJ_`, which validate against different endpoints
- `Mailchimp API key` – capture hardcodes `-us20`; the endpoint also derives from the key's datacenter suffix
- `Instagram access token` – trailing character included in the match
- `Meta access token` – trailing character included in the match
- `Oculus access token` – trailing character included in the match
- `Github App Token` – capture-group fix upstream (secret-detection-rules!229; needs [rule change policy](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/629010) finalized first)
### Region-split Hosts (8)
> Separate US/EU (or AU) hosts and the finding does not encode its region. A live key tested on the wrong host returns 401/403 and would misreport as inactive. Needs a multi-endpoint client (hand-written today) or generator support for trying hosts in sequence.
- `Intercom API token`
- `LangChainAPIKey` (403 for bad credentials, tested)
- `New Relic REST API Key`
- `Onfido Live API Token` – region is in the prefix (`api_live.`, `api_live_us.`, `api_live_ca.`):
- Note that auth prefix `Token token=` is already supported (!261893)
- `PostHogPersonalAPIkey`
- `Segment Public API token` (403 for bad credentials, tested)
- `Typeform API token` (403 for bad credentials, tested)
- `GrafanaCloudAccessPolicyToken` – the Cloud API requires a `region` query parameter the token does not encode
### Generator Changes (16)
> The request needs something the generator cannot produce yet: an auth style, a header prefix, a request body or the token in the query string.
`basic_password` auth style - !258812 :white_check_mark:
- `AzurePersonalAccessToken`
- `Mailgun private API token`
POST request body:
- `Dropbox short lived API token`
- `Dropbox long lived API token`
- `DropboxAppAccessToken`
- `Linear API token`
- `New Relic user API Key` (also region-split)
- `HighnoteLiveSecretKey`
- `HighnoteTestSecretKey`
Auth header value prefix (`OAuth <t>`, `Token token=<t>`, `AccessKey <t>`...) - !261893 :white_check_mark:
- `messagebird-api-token` !262235 DONE :white_check_mark:
- `Pulumi API token` !261915 DONE :white_check_mark:
- `Shippo API token` !262192 DONE :white_check_mark:
- `Shippo Test API token` !262192 DONE :white_check_mark:
- `Yandex.Cloud API Key` !263436 - in review :hourglass_flowing_sand:
Query-param auth (deliberately unsupported today):
- `Mapbox API token`
- `MapboxSecretApiToken`
### Code Changes (6)
> The rule needs no change, but our code must clean the detected value (quotes, a URL parameter) or look it up in more than one model before a validity check can run.
- `EasyPost API token` !260411 DONE :white_check_mark:
- `EasyPost test API token` !260420 DONE :white_check_mark:
- `GoCardless API token` !261169 and !261172 DONE :white_check_mark:
- `Hashicorp Terraform user/org API token` https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/259344 - DONE :white_check_mark:
- `gitlab_feed_token` – the match includes `feed_token=` URL parameter; we need to strip it, then look up with `FEED_TOKEN_CONFIG`
- `gitlab_runner_registration_token` – `TokenLookupService#find` reads one model per token type, but this token is stored on `Project` and `Group`
### Hand-written client (3)
> The vendor returns the verdict in the response body, or the token can only be checked offline, so a status-code mapping cannot express the check.
- `SlackAppLevelToken` – the API answers HTTP 200 with the verdict in the body
- `SlackAppConfigurationToken` – same
- `AzureEntraIDToken` – offline JWT validation; no unambiguous HTTP code
### Parked (5)
> No HTTP status reliably means a dead token, or the token expires too soon to be worth checking, so we do not build a check for now.
- `AWSBedrockKey` – tested 403 for bad auth, but AWS 403 also means valid-without-permission; regional endpoints
- `AWSBedrockShortLivedKey` – same
- `AdobeIMSAccessToken` – 24h lifetime; userinfo needs client context
- `FigmaPersonalAccessToken` – scoped tokens: 403 covers both dead and live-but-wrong-scope (tested 403 for garbage)
- `GCPVertexExpressModeKey` – query auth and no unambiguous dead code
### Multi-token Validation (40)
> The detected value only authenticates together with a second value, such as a client ID or a username, that the finding does not contain.
- `Twilio API Key` – API secret
- `Twilio Account SID` – API secret
- `DockerPersonalAccessToken` – username
- `AzureEntraClientSecret` – client + tenant id
- `AWSSecretAccessKey` – access key id
- `AWSSessionToken` – key pair
- `Atlassian API token` – email as basic username
- `AtlassianUserApiToken` – email as basic username
- `Adobe Client Secret` – client id
- `Alibaba AccessKey ID` – pair
- `Alibaba Secret Key` – pair
- `Asana Client Secret` – client id
- `Auth0ApplicationClientSecret` – domain + client id
- `Bitbucket client secret` – client id
- `Clojars API token` – username
- `Contentful delivery API token` – space id
- `Contentful preview API token` – space id
- `Discord client secret` – client id
- `Dropbox API secret/key` – app pair
- `Facebook token` – debug_token needs app credentials
- `Finicity API token` – partner credentials
- `Finicity client secret` – partner id
- `Intercom client secret/ID` – pair
- `Linear client secret/ID` – pair
- `Linkedin Client secret` – client id
- `MaxMind License Key` – account id
- `OktaClientSecret` – client id
- `Planetscale API token` – token id
- `PlanetscaleAppSecret` – app id
- `PlanetscaleOAuthSecret` – client id
- `PostmanCollectionAccessKey` – collection id
- `Sendinblue SMTP token` – pairs with account login over SMTP
- `Shopify shared secret` – app context
- `ShopifyPartnerAPIToken` – organization id
- `TailscaleOauthClientSecret` – client id
- `TencentCloudSecretID` – pair
- `Twitch API token` – client id (the rule targets client secrets, and `/oauth2/validate` returns 401 for a live one, tested)
- `Twitter token` – app/OAuth context
- `VolcengineAccessKeyID` – pair
- `Yandex.Cloud AWS API compatible Access Secret` – key id
### Per-customer Endpoint (33)
> The token only works against the customer's own host, such as a self-hosted instance or an org subdomain, and the finding does not contain that host.
- `AivenServicePassword`
- `ArtifactoryApiKey`
- `ArtifactoryIdentityToken`
- `JfrogPlatformAccessToken`
- `Databricks API token`
- `DynatracePlatformToken`
- `GrafanaServiceAccountToken`
- `Hashicorp Vault batch token`
- `HashicorpVaultServiceToken`
- `KubernetesServiceAccToken`
- `OktaAPIToken`
- `OktaAPITokenHeader`
- `Planetscale password`
- `Shopify access token`
- `Shopify custom app access token`
- `Shopify private app access token`
- `SonarQubeUserToken`
- `SonarQubeGlobalAnalysisToken`
- `SonarQubeProjectAnalysisToken`
- `SplunkAuthToken`
- `SplunkHECToken`
- `AzureAPIManagementDirectKey`
- `AzureAPIManagementGatewayKey`
- `AzureAppConfigConnectionString`
- `AzureCommServicesConnectionString`
- `AzureCosmosDBCredentials`
- `AzureEventGridAccessKey`
- `AzureEventGridSAS`
- `AzureFunctionsAPIKeyViaHeader`
- `AzureFunctionsAPIKeyViaURL`
- `AzureLogicAppSAS`
- `AzureOpenAIAPIKey`
- `AzureSignalRAccessKey`
## Not Verifiable (36)
- `SSH private key`
- `SSH (DSA) private key`
- `SSH (EC) private key`
- `RSA private key`
- `PGP private key`
- `PKCS8 private key`
- `Age secret key`
- `Password in URL`
- `PyPI upload token` – upload-only
- `Mailgun public validation key` – validation API discontinued
- `Mailgun webhook signing key`
- `New Relic ingest browser API token`
- `New Relic ingest browser API token v2`
- `New Relic user API ID` – identifier
- `Yandex.Cloud IAM Cookie v1 - 1`
- `Yandex.Cloud IAM Cookie v1 - 2`
- `digitalocean-refresh-token` – exchange-only, minting side effects
- `SlackAppConfigurationRefreshToken` – exchange-only; checking it rotates the token pair
- `Github Refresh Token` – exchange-only; checking it rotates the token pair
- `Slack Webhook` – validating means posting
- `Discord API key` – generic context hex, not a verifiable credential
- `Lob Publishable API Key`
- `Flutterwave public key`
- `Flutterwave encrypted key`
- `FlutterwaveProdPublicKey`
- `FlutterwaveProdEncryptedKey`
- `PostHogProjectAPIkey` – public by design
- `AmazonOAuthClientID` – identifier
- `Adobe Client ID (Oauth Web)` – identifier
- `Discord client ID` – identifier
- `Linkedin Client ID` – identifier
- `Bitbucket client ID` – identifier
- `Asana Client ID` – identifier
- `AWSCognitoIdentityPoolID` – identifier
- `MessageBird API client ID` – identifier
- `TailscalePersonalAuthKey` – registers devices
## Suggested Order
1. Keep generating from the viable list.
2. Merge !258812 (`basic_password`) to unlock Azure DevOps PAT and Mailgun.
3. Fold the rule-change bucket into the rule-changes policy work – those 8 rules gate their verifiers.
4. Decide the region-split class once (generator multi-host support vs hand-written) – it gates 8 rules including several popular vendors.
5. Generator changes by unlock count: value prefix (5), POST body (7), query auth (2).
6. Multi-token validation design covers the 40-rule bucket; tracked separately.
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