Scanner-level `vulnerability_states` is ignored for pre-existing findings when an approval rule mixes new and pre-existing states
### Summary
`scanner_with_attributes` supports a scanner-level `vulnerability_states` array. The JSON schema in `ee/app/validators/json_schemas/approval_policy_rule_content.json` accepts the field and describes it as:
> Scanner-specific vulnerability states. Overrides rule-level vulnerability_states for this scanner.
The override is honored for rules whose `vulnerability_states` contain **only** pre-existing states, and it is honored as a query-grouping key in both grouped evaluators. It is **not** honored for the pre-existing part of the evaluation when a rule mixes newly detected and pre-existing states. In that case a scanner-level `vulnerability_states: [new_needs_triage]` has no effect, and pre-existing `detected` or `confirmed` vulnerabilities for that scanner are still counted and reported as `Previously existing` violations by the Security Bot.
Two further problems follow from this:
- The behaviour is silent. The policy validates, the field round-trips through the GraphQL API, and nothing warns the policy author that the override is inert.
- The public `scanner_with_attributes` documentation table does not list `vulnerability_states` at all, so the schema and the documentation disagree about whether the field exists.
A customer discovered this while rolling a PCI-DSS related approval policy out to 27 projects. They read the schema, set the field, and concluded correctly that GitLab was applying the rule-level states instead.
### Steps to reproduce
1. On GitLab 18.11 or later, create a merge request approval policy with a `scan_finding` rule that mixes a newly detected state with pre-existing states, and set a narrower `vulnerability_states` on one scanner object:
```yaml
---
approval_policy:
- name: Mixed-state rule with a scanner-level state override
enabled: true
rules:
- type: scan_finding
branch_type: protected
vulnerabilities_allowed: 0
severity_levels:
- critical
- high
scanners:
- type: dependency_scanning
vulnerability_states:
- new_needs_triage
vulnerability_states:
- new_needs_triage
- detected
- confirmed
actions:
- type: require_approval
approvals_required: 1
role_approvers:
- maintainer
```
2. In a scoped project, let Dependency Scanning detect a High or Critical vulnerability on the default branch, so a vulnerability record exists in the `detected` state.
3. Open a merge request that removes the affected dependency, and let the source pipeline complete with no High or Critical Dependency Scanning findings.
4. Read the inherited policy YAML back through the GraphQL API and confirm the scanner-level `vulnerability_states` is still present.
5. Inspect the merge request.
### Example Project
Reproducible on any Ultimate project with Dependency Scanning and the policy above. No example project attached, because the reported occurrence is in a private customer namespace.
### What is the current *bug* behavior?
- The merge request is blocked with `security_policy_violations` and requires a security-policy approval.
- The Security Bot lists the removed findings under `Previously existing`, even though the MR security report classifies the same findings as `Fixed`.
- The scanner-level `vulnerability_states: [new_needs_triage]` has no effect on the outcome. The rule-level `detected` and `confirmed` states are applied to the `dependency_scanning` scanner regardless.
- Rerunning the scan job and letting the bot comment refresh does not change the verdict, so this is not stale evaluation or refresh lag.
### What is the expected *correct* behavior?
One of the following, whichever matches product intent:
- The scanner-level `vulnerability_states` overrides the rule-level value for that scanner across the whole evaluation, including the pre-existing calculation. With the policy above, the pre-existing `detected` and `confirmed` findings from `dependency_scanning` would not be evaluated, and the merge request would not be blocked.
- Or, if scanner-level `vulnerability_states` is not intended to be supported, the field is removed from the `scanner_with_attributes` schema, or rejected at validation time, so that a policy author cannot silently configure an inert override.
Either way, the schema description and the public documentation must agree with the implemented behaviour.
### Relevant logs and/or screenshots
No logs required. The behaviour is visible in the code paths below.
`ee/lib/security/scan_result_policies/rule.rb` carries the scanner-level value into each `ScannerConfig`, and treats it as an override attribute:
```ruby
SCANNER_OVERRIDE_ATTRIBUTES = %i[
vulnerability_attributes severity_levels vulnerabilities_allowed vulnerability_states is_malicious
].freeze
# build_scanner_config
vulnerability_states: scanner_hash[:vulnerability_states] || vulnerability_states,
```
Both grouped evaluators include it in the grouping key and return it on the group result:
- `ee/lib/security/scan_result_policies/grouped_findings_evaluator.rb` — `group_key_mapping` includes `vulnerability_states: :vulnerability_states`, and `GroupResult` carries `vulnerability_states`.
- `ee/lib/security/scan_result_policies/grouped_vulnerabilities_evaluator.rb` — `group_key_mapping` includes `vulnerability_states: :state`.
`ee/app/services/security/scan_result_policies/update_approvals_service.rb` handles rules that include newly detected states. It never reads `group_result.vulnerability_states`. Every state-dependent decision in the grouped path falls back to the rule level:
```ruby
def evaluate_group_violation(group_result, target_uuids, approval_rule)
group_allowed = group_result.vulnerabilities_allowed || approval_rule.vulnerabilities_allowed
new_uuids = (group_result.uuids || []) - target_uuids
if only_newly_detected?(approval_rule) # rule-level states
...
else
evaluate_previously_existing_states(group_result, target_uuids, new_uuids, approval_rule, group_allowed)
end
end
def evaluate_previously_existing_states(group_result, target_uuids, new_uuids, approval_rule, group_allowed)
previously_existing = ((group_result.uuids || []) + target_uuids - new_uuids).uniq
previously_existing = uuids_matching_policy_states(previously_existing, approval_rule) # rule-level states
vulnerabilities_count = vulnerabilities_count_for_uuids(combined_uuids, approval_rule, group_allowed) # rule-level states
...
end
```
`uuids_matching_policy_states`, `vulnerabilities_count_for_uuids` and `dismissed_filter_for` all derive their states from `approval_rule.vulnerability_states_for_branch`, so `group_result.vulnerability_states` is computed and then discarded.
By contrast, `ee/app/services/security/scan_result_policies/sync_preexisting_states_approval_rules_service.rb` handles rules with no newly detected states and does pass the group state through, so the override works there. `evaluate_rules` is reached only for rules where `include_newly_detected?` is false, which is why the inconsistency is invisible unless a rule mixes both categories.
Documentation gap, in `doc/user/application_security/policies/merge_request_approval_policies.md`, the `scanner_with_attributes` object table lists `type`, `severity_levels`, `vulnerabilities_allowed`, `vulnerability_attributes` and `is_malicious`, and omits `vulnerability_states`. The surrounding text states that "Any field not specified at the scanner level falls back to the setting defined by the rule-level value", which reads as a guarantee that a field specified at the scanner level is used.
### Output of checks
Reproduced on GitLab.com (SaaS) 19.5.0. Not applicable to a self-managed environment check.
### Possible fixes
- In `UpdateApprovalsService`, thread the per-group states through the pre-existing calculation instead of reading them from the approval rule. `evaluate_group_violation` and `evaluate_previously_existing_states` already receive `group_result`, so `group_result.vulnerability_states` can drive `only_newly_detected?`, `uuids_matching_policy_states`, `vulnerabilities_count_for_uuids` and `dismissed_filter_for` for that group, with the rule-level value as the fallback when the scanner sets nothing.
- Add specs covering a mixed-state rule with a scanner-level `vulnerability_states` that is narrower than the rule-level value, asserting that pre-existing findings for that scanner are excluded. The current grouped-evaluator specs cover grouping, not the downstream pre-existing calculation.
- Add the `vulnerability_states` row to the `scanner_with_attributes` documentation table, and state explicitly which parts of the evaluation honor it.
- If the field is not meant to be supported, remove it from `scanner_with_attributes` in both `approval_policy_rule_content.json` and `security_orchestration_policy.json`, and remove it from `SCANNER_VALID_KEYS` in `ee/app/assets/javascripts/security_orchestration/components/policy_editor/scan_result/lib/rules.js`.
### Open questions for the group
- Is scanner-level `vulnerability_states` intended to be supported? It reached the schema through #584704, whose stated scope was per-scanner `vulnerability_attributes`.
- Does saving a policy through the visual policy editor preserve a hand-written scanner-level `vulnerability_states`? `SCANNER_VALID_KEYS` lists it as a permitted scanner key, but there is no UI control for it and the round-trip is untested.
### Customer impact
- A GitLab.com Ultimate customer has raised this issue in a support ticket.
- Forward risk they raised, which is worth recording: if GitLab later starts honoring the override, any policy that still carries a narrower scanner-level `vulnerability_states` will silently narrow from overdue-backlog enforcement to new-only enforcement for that scanner. That is a compliance-control regression triggered by a GitLab change, with no policy edit by the customer.
### Related
- #580704 — Exclude Fixed Vulnerabilities in Merge Requests from MR Approval Blocking Policy. The reporting customer hits both. That issue is the separate, known limitation that pre-existing states are evaluated against the default branch; this issue is the scanner-level override gap and is independent of it.
- #584704 — BE: Add support for atomic scanner rule criteria. The change that introduced `scanner_with_attributes`.
issue
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