Warn users on SAML instances when their session expires from inactivity
## Problem
On a self-managed or Dedicated instance that uses SAML, a user whose session expires from inactivity gets no indication of it. The page they left open keeps looking fully functional: filters and other interactions either do nothing or render stale data, nothing is logged, and no error appears. The only way to discover it is to reload or navigate, at which point they are bounced to the identity provider, sometimes silently re-authenticated, and the page abruptly works again.
GitLab already has a modal for this, `SessionExpire|Your session has expired`, but it only renders when the instance is configured to expire sessions **from the time of sign-in**. On the default setting, "expire from time of last session activity", it never renders.
## Evidence
- [Vulnerability report filters silently stop working after session expiry](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/603867): a Dedicated Ultimate customer using SAML ([ZD 726726](https://gitlab.zendesk.com/agent/tickets/726726)) whose vulnerability report served stale, unfiltered data after idling. Their report notes that "refreshing the page or navigating away correctly redirects to the login screen", which is the signature of the session itself having expired.
- Sayo's SaaS vs self-managed comparison in the SAML re-authentication UI audit, [#571169 (note_3151998591)](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/571169#note_3151998591), with a [video for self-managed](https://youtu.be/AGxbh4O5HK8):
> * When the session expires there's no indication of it.
> * If you are in the middle of editing something or adding a comment and try to `Save changes`, the buttons behave inconsistently, error messages **_may_** appear and even rails pages may be displayed.
> * When error messages are available they are different depending on which page you're in - and also not helpful. Users don't get informed the reason why an error occurred.
- [#606354](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/606354) describes the same symptom from the other end: "background API/GraphQL requests fail quietly (e.g. pipeline pages stop live-updating) and the next navigation triggers a full IdP redirect".
## Where the existing SAML reload modal does and does not appear
Worth stating precisely, because it is the reason this gap went unnoticed for so long. On an instance whose only sign-in method is instance-level SAML, `ee/app/views/shared/_saml_reload_modal.html.haml` **never renders, on any page**. Two independent conditions must hold, and instance SAML fails the first:
1. The resource's root ancestor must have a **Group SAML** provider record (`root_group.saml_provider`), created in Group > Settings > SAML SSO. That requires the separate `group_saml` OmniAuth provider and the `group_saml` licensed feature. Configuring the `saml` OmniAuth provider for the instance creates no such record on any group.
2. The partial is rendered from only two layouts, `app/views/layouts/group.html.haml` and `app/views/layouts/project.html.haml`. Even where it does apply, the homepage, To-Do list, dashboards, search, admin area and user settings are never covered.
## Why this is not a port of the SAML reload modal
This issue was originally filed as "extend the SAML reload modal to instance-level SAML". That framing does not survive contact with the code, and it is recorded here so nobody spends the time again.
On GitLab.com, Group SAML maintains a **second, shorter session** alongside the Rails session (`Gitlab::Auth::GroupSaml::SsoState`, one day by default or the IdP's `SessionNotOnOrAfter`), enforced in `EE::GroupPolicy` and `EE::ProjectPolicy` through `SsoEnforcer.access_restricted?`. Reads start returning nothing while the user is still signed in to GitLab. That second session is what the SAML reload modal watches, and the only reason a SAML-specific modal exists.
Instance-level SAML has no such session. `Gitlab::Auth::Saml::SsoEnforcer` is not consulted by any policy: its only callers are merge request approval re-authentication (`EE::MergeRequests::ApprovalService`, `EE::MergeRequestPresenter#instance_requires_saml_auth_for_approval?`), both passing `session_timeout: 0.seconds` to demand a *fresh* SAML authentication at approval time. So on a SAML instance the SAML session and the Rails session are effectively the same thing, and nothing degrades until the Rails session dies.
The fix is therefore the **generic** session expiry modal, which already exists and is already mounted globally. It only needs a deadline for the activity-based case, and an audience.
## Current state
| | Where it lives | When it renders |
|---|---|---|
| Generic session expiry modal | `app/views/layouts/_session_expire_modal.html.haml`, rendered from `app/views/layouts/_page.html.haml`, mounted by `initExpireSessionModal()` in `main.js` | Only when `Gitlab::CurrentSettings.session_expire_from_init` is enabled, which defaults to `false` |
| SAML reload modal | `ee/app/views/shared/_saml_reload_modal.html.haml`, mounted by `initSamlReloadModal()` in `main_ee.js` | Only for Group SAML, and only from the group and project layouts (see above) |
Both render the same component, `app/assets/javascripts/authentication/sessions/components/session_expire_modal.vue`, which already polls, reacts to `visibilitychange`, and syncs across tabs over a `BroadcastChannel`. With a `signInUrl` its primary action reads "Sign in".
The deadline for the activity-based case is already available server side: `Gitlab::Sessions::CacheStore` records `LAST_WRITE_AT_KEY` (`_gitlab_session_last_write_at`) in the session, so the expiry is `last_write_at + session_expire_delay`. No extra Redis round trip is needed.
## Scope: SAML instances only
The activity-based prompt is limited to instances with SAML configured, using the existing `Gitlab::Auth::Saml::Config.enabled?` (a configuration read, no query, already used in `EE::Group`, `EE::GroupPolicy`, `ScimFinder` and `EE::API::Helpers`).
Why not everywhere:
- The harm being fixed is worst on SAML instances, where an expired session redirects through an external identity provider rather than to a GitLab sign-in page.
- SAML instances are where short session durations are actually configured. On GitLab.com, where sessions slide for seven days, the prompt would be close to dead code while still shipping to every signed-in user on every page.
- It keeps the blast radius proportionate for a staged rollout.
What this knowingly leaves out: a self-managed instance **without** SAML that configures a short session duration has the identical silent-stale-data problem and will not get the prompt. That is a deliberate first step, not an argument that those users do not matter. Widening the audience later is a one-line change plus a rollout.
Expiry from the time of sign-in (`session_expire_from_init`) is unaffected and continues to apply to all instances exactly as today.
## Proposal
1. **A single source of truth for the session deadline**, covering both settings: the existing fixed deadline (`signed_in_at + timeout_value`, today's `Gitlab::Auth::SessionExpireFromInitEnforcer.session_expires_at`) when `session_expire_from_init` is enabled, and `last_write_at + session_expire_delay` otherwise. It should report "unknown" rather than a bogus value when neither is derivable. This belongs in `lib/gitlab/sessions/`, not on `SessionExpireFromInitEnforcer`, whose name would then no longer describe what it does. Only the activity-based branch is limited to SAML instances and to the feature flag.
2. **Render the modal whenever a deadline is known**, by relaxing the `session_expire_from_init` guard in `app/views/layouts/_session_expire_modal.html.haml`. No new mount point: `layouts/_page.html.haml` already covers every page, which is what makes this work on the homepage and To-Do list where the SAML reload modal never reached.
3. **Point `SessionsHelper#session_expire_modal_data` at the new deadline**, keeping the existing `sign_in_url`.
4. **Keep the deadline fresh while the user is active in the page.** With activity-based expiry every request extends the session server side, so a deadline stamped at page render would fire early on long-lived pages such as boards, pipeline pages, or the vulnerability report. Return the deadline on responses in a header and have the frontend rebroadcast it on the `BroadcastChannel` the component already resets from.
- This must cover both HTTP paths. `app/assets/javascripts/lib/graphql.js` uses `HttpLink`/`createUploadLink` over `fetch`, not axios, so an axios response interceptor alone would never reset the timer on a GraphQL-driven page, which is precisely the reported case in [#603867](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/603867). An `ApolloLink` alongside the existing `performanceBarLink` is the established pattern.
- No client-initiated keep-alive or polling: an extra authenticated request would refresh the session TTL and keep idle tabs signed in indefinitely, defeating inactivity expiry. React only to traffic the application already sends.
5. **Feature flag** `session_expire_modal_on_saml_instances` (`group::authentication`, default off).
6. **Tests**, extending what exists: `spec/views/layouts/_session_expire_modal.html.haml_spec.rb`, `spec/helpers/sessions_helper_spec.rb`, `spec/frontend/authentication/sessions/components/session_expire_modal_spec.js`, plus new specs for the deadline class (both settings, SAML configured and not, missing keys, throttled-write lag), the interceptor, the Apollo link, and a feature spec.
## Known limitation to document, not to solve here
Session writes are throttled (`Gitlab::Sessions::CacheStore::WRITE_THROTTLE_INTERVAL`, capped at `redis_expiry / WRITE_THROTTLE_EXPIRY_RATIO`), so the recorded `last_write_at` can trail real activity. The resulting deadline is therefore slightly pessimistic: it can show the modal a little early, but it will not claim a live session is dead. Related: [#606354](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/606354).
## How to validate locally
1. Configure a SAML OmniAuth provider for the instance.
2. Admin area > Settings > General > Account and limit: set **Session duration** to a few minutes, leaving **Expire from time of last session activity** selected (the default).
3. Sign in, open a page, idle past the duration. Expect the modal.
4. Confirm it does **not** appear while actively browsing, including on a page driven entirely by GraphQL.
5. Confirm an instance without SAML configured gets no modal and no `X-Gitlab-Session-Expires-At` header.
6. Repeat with **Expire from time of session creation** to confirm that path is unchanged, on instances with and without SAML.
7. Open two tabs and confirm the modal state stays in sync.
## Out of scope
- **The SaaS gap in the same audit comment:** the SAML reload modal is rendered only from the group and project layouts, so on GitLab.com the homepage and To-Do list still give no indication that a Group SAML session expired. That mount should move to `layouts/_page.html.haml` too, coordinated with [Move SAML reload modal into a gated entrypoint](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/604090). **This issue does not fix that**, and the two should not be confused: they are different sessions with different deadlines.
- **Giving instance-level SAML a session of its own**, so that a SAML-specific prompt would have something to watch. A product change well beyond this issue, related to the component model caveat in [#603867 (note_3518620934)](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/603867#note_3518620934).
- **Self-managed instances without SAML** that configure a short session duration, as described under Scope.
- **The Apollo half of [#603867](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/603867)**: `ERROR_POLICY_ALL` serving stale cached data on error in `vulnerability_list_graphql.vue`. Its proposed 401 handler in the Apollo link chain overlaps with step 4 above, so the two should be built once, not twice.
## Related
- [Vulnerability report filters silently stop working after session expiry](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/603867) - the customer report that surfaced this
- [UI Audit: Re-authenticate with SAML](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/571169) - umbrella audit, including the SaaS vs self-managed comparison
- [Session write throttling breaks activity-based expiry](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/606354)
- [Move SAML reload modal into a gated entrypoint](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/604090)
issue
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