Instance admins and auditor role support for AR
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## Problem
`.com` AR recognizes two authorities: Organization **owner** and **member**. Self-Managed instances add two user types with no representation in the AR auth model today:
- **Instance admin** — the SM equivalent of an Org owner (should get full control of AR), but access is gated behind **admin mode**, a session-scoped step-up, not a static user attribute.
- **Auditor** — read-only visibility across the whole instance.
Result: an SM instance admin is currently minted as a plain `member` and locked out of managing AR, and an auditor has no representation at all.
## Requirements
- The system must grant an SM instance admin the same AR access as an organization owner (full read/write across every AR resource on the instance) — but only while their admin-mode session is active, not merely by virtue of holding the Administrator role as a static attribute.
- The system must grant an SM auditor read-only access to every AR resource on the instance, without requiring an explicit role assignment or relationship tuple on any individual resource.
- The system must authorize an impersonated request's AR actions as the impersonated user (permissions resolve identically to that user acting on their own), while still making the real admin identifiable for audit purposes — an impersonated session must not be indistinguishable, end to end, from the impersonated user acting alone.
## Possible approaches (implementation notes)
> **Note:** Final design details may read better in an ADR/proposal MR than in this issue — similar to how the interim AR design and BatchCheck live in their own proposals rather than in the tracking issue. The sketches below are for orientation only.
### Current state (code)
The token GitLab Rails mints for AR is built in `ee/lib/authn/token_exchange/token_issuer.rb`. The only authorization signal today is `gitlab_organization_role`, a binary `owner`/`member` from `User#owns_organization?`:
```ruby
gitlab_realm: ::CloudConnector.gitlab_realm,
gitlab_organization_id: @user.organization_id,
gitlab_organization_role: organization_role # 'owner' if owns_organization?, else 'member'
```
On SM an instance admin does not necessarily _own_ the auto-confirmed Organization (`Organizations::OrganizationUser` is a flat `default`/`owner` enum), so `organization_role` returns `member`. The predicates for the missing types already exist:
- `User#admin?` + `Gitlab::Auth::CurrentUserMode#admin_mode?` (`lib/gitlab/auth/current_user_mode.rb`)
- `User#auditor?` (`ee/app/models/ee/user.rb`, license-gated)
For impersonation: `User#impersonator` / `User#impersonated?` already exist (`app/models/user.rb`) — `current_user.impersonator` is the real admin during an impersonated session. `TokenIssuer#payload` only encodes `@user` (whichever user `current_user` currently resolves to), so an impersonated request mints a token indistinguishable from the impersonated user acting alone. If a `TokenIssuer` rework goes ahead, threading `current_user.impersonator&.id` through in the same pass would avoid a second round of changes later.
### Option A: SM-only token claim (derived roles)
Model instance admin and auditor as **derived roles** per [AUTH-022](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/architecture/auth-architecture/design-doc/-/merge_requests/129) — system-produced, never written through the Relationships API (same class as `public_anonymous`).
1. **Token (Authentication / Rails):** add an SM-only claim to the payload, e.g. `gitlab_instance_role: admin | auditor`, set only when `gitlab_realm == 'self-managed'`. Compute `admin` **only when admin mode is active** — this requires threading admin-mode state from `API::Authn::TokenExchange` into `TokenIssuer`, which today receives only `user:`.
2. **AuthZ resolution (GATE Core / GLAZ):** map `admin` → instance-admin derived role (Org-owner-equivalent), `auditor` → a read-only derived role. No relationship tuples written for either.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant R as GitLab Rails (token_exchange)
participant TI as TokenIssuer
participant AR as Artifact Registry
participant GZ as GLAZ (Cedar)
R->>TI: mint JWT for current_user (+ admin_mode state)
Note over TI: add gitlab_instance_role = admin/auditor (SM only)
TI-->>AR: signed JWT
AR->>GZ: check(subject, action, resource, context)
Note over GZ: derive role from claim (AUTH-022), no tuple lookup
GZ-->>AR: ALLOW / DENY
```
### Option B: durable relationship tuples
Instead of a token claim, write a **durable tuple** per role ("this user is auditor" / "this user is instance admin"), written/revoked exactly when that status changes — the same lifecycle as the existing org-owner tuple. A tuple write also gives a natural audit event for free (relevant to gitlab-org/gitlab#607003).
- **Auditor:** a clean fit — auditor status is a durable user attribute with no session component.
- **Instance admin:** tuples could work too, but admin mode's session-freshness should probably **not** be modeled as a session-scoped tuple — that would reintroduce a revoke-on-timeout reliability question no other tuple in the system has today. If admin-mode gating turns out to be needed, it may fit better as a **per-request context signal that Cedar conditions on**, layered on top of a plain durable admin tuple.
## Design references
- [AUTH-022 — role classification (assignable / resource_type)](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/architecture/auth-architecture/design-doc/-/merge_requests/129) — classes instance admin + auditor as derived roles
- [Proposal 015 — interim identity mapping / bootstrapping](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/architecture/auth-architecture/design-doc/-/blob/main/proposals/015-identity-mapping-interim-design.md)
- [Auth contract R6 — bootstrapping](https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/engineering/architecture/design-documents/artifact_registry/agreements/auth/#r6--bootstrapping)
- Parent epic: gitlab-org#22669
## Open questions
- [ ] **Does AR need to gate on admin-mode freshness at all?** Needs confirmation with product before settling on either implementation shape. (Related: is admin-mode enforcement required for closed beta, or is `User#admin?` sufficient for the demo?)
- [ ] Token claim (Option A) vs durable tuples (Option B) — and should the decision be captured in an ADR/proposal MR rather than this issue?
- [ ] Auditor semantics: read-only across _all_ AR resources including private repos? (confirm with AR)
- [ ] Is auditor carried even without admin mode? (likely yes — not a step-up role)
- [ ] Ownership split: Rails-side signal (claim or tuple write) = **Authentication**; role resolution + identity mapping = **GATE Core / GLAZ**. Confirm at the CNG deep-dive.
## Scope
**In:** representing SM instance admin and auditor in AR authorization — the Rails-side signal (token claim or tuple lifecycle) plus the GLAZ resolution contract. **Out:** broader SM RBAC changes.
## Original context
> Unlike TLG group owners for .com, or the Org owners that we have directly embedded, SM also has Instance admins and auditor user types. Instance admins can be considered Org owners, but we would need to know the scope or type based on [design-doc!129](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/architecture/auth-architecture/design-doc/-/merge_requests/129). This also means considering admin_mode support for Admins.
## Access-time auditing
Moved here from [#607003](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/607003): auditors need a record of registry reads and pulls, not only of writes and deletes. The registry-action trail itself is tracked in [#605696](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/605696).
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