Demoted member continues having read and write access to projects using his deploy key which victim is unaware of

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HackerOne report #2038990 by theluci on 2023-06-26, assigned to @greg:

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Hello,

Background

Gitlab provides a feature to set up Deploy Keys.
Only the maintainers/owner of a project can create or view project’s deploy keys.

There is no option to see the owner/creator of the deploy key through the UI, however, Gitlab provides the following API endpoint to List the project deploy keys for a specific user,

curl --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN: <your_access_token>" "https://gitlab.com/api/v4/users/id_or_username/project_deploy_keys"  

Where, id_or_username is the ID or username of the user to get the project deploy keys for.

Vulnerability

According to the docs, this API endpoint is used to list project deploy keys for a specific user.

The doc states,

It lists only the enabled project keys from the common projects of requester and requestee.

It can be seen that the API endpoint was supposed to list the project deploy keys that a specific user (requestee) has in the current project by looking at the common projects between the requester and requestee.
However, the above endpoint does not return any result if the requestee is demoted.

That is, if victim has a project victim-project where attacker is one of the maintainers and had set up his deploy key.
Then, after attacker is demoted (maybe to a guest role) and victim runs the following command,

curl --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN: <victim_access_token>" "https://gitlab.com/api/v4/users/attacker_username/project_deploy_keys"  

<----------------------------------------------------Important---------------------------------------------------->

No results are returned leading victim to believe that attacker does not have any enabled deploy keys.

This is contradictory to documentation as attacker is still a member of victim-project and has an enabled deploy key which should’ve been returned by looking at the common projects of requester and requestee.

attacker can now continue having read and write access to victim-project using his deploy key which victim is unaware of.

<------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------>

Steps to reproduce

  1. victim creates a group victim-group and a project victim-project inside.
  2. victim goes to https://gitlab.com/<victim-group>/<victim-project>/-/settings/repository, Expand Deploy keys and adds a few deploy keys.

In a real-world scenario, there will already be a few keys added to the project.

  1. victim goes to victim-group membership page https://gitlab.com/groups/<victim-group>/-/group_members and adds attacker as maintainer.

  2. attacker visits https://gitlab.com/<victim-group>/<victim-project>/-/settings/repository, Expand Deploy keys and adds a trustworthy looking deploy key such as CI_SERVER_FALLBACK_KEY. (Be sure to grant write permissions as well.)

  3. victim goes to victim-group membership page https://gitlab.com/groups/<victim-group>/-/group_members and demotes attacker as guest.

  4. victim runs the following command to make sure attacker doesn’t have an enabled deploy key,

curl --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN: <victim_access_token>" "https://gitlab.com/api/v4/users/attacker_username/project_deploy_keys"  

No results are returned leading victim to believe that attacker does not have any enabled deploy keys.

26jun-1.png

  1. attacker can now continue having read and write access to victim-project using his deploy key.

attacker goes to his terminal and runs the following commands,

git clone git@gitlab.com:<victim-group>/<victim-project>.git  
cd victim-project  
git init  
git checkout -b other  
echo “Some text” > Sample.txt  
git add .  
git commit -m "my commit"  
git push origin other  

POC

Output of checks

This bug happens on GitLab.com (Probably on instance too).

Impact

A demoted member can continue having read and write access to projects using his deploy key which victim is unaware of.

Attachments

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How To Reproduce

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