Red Team Handbook rewrite

Why is this change being made?

The Red Team handbook page is a bit outdated and requires a bit of a refresh. See https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/security-operations/redteam/redteam-internal/red-team-operations/-/issues/1371+ for details.

Proposed structure:

• Red Team (main page)
  • Stealth operations (subpage)
  • Purple team operations (subpage)
  • Opportunistic attacks (subpage)
    • Club Red
  • Research (subpage, if needed)
  • How we operate (subpage)
    • General operations
    • How we measure success
      • metrics
    • rules of engagement (separate page maybe? like it is now)
    • Red Team maturity model

I wanted to capture that the current page has a bit too much "how" on it and visitors (who we don't work with often) might want to drill down into each part separately.

Author and Reviewer Checklist

Please verify the check list and ensure to tick them off before the MR is merged.

• Provided a concise title for this Merge Request (MR)
• Added a description to this MR explaining the reasons for the proposed change, per say why, not just what
  • Copy/paste the Slack conversation to document it for later, or upload screenshots. Verify that no confidential data is added, and the content is SAFE
• Assign reviewers for this MR to the correct Directly Responsible Individual/s (DRI)
  • If the DRI for the page/s being updated isn’t immediately clear, then assign it to one of the people listed in the Maintained by section on the page being edited
  • If your manager does not have merge rights, please ask someone to merge it AFTER it has been approved by your manager in #mr-buddies
  • The when to get approval handbook section explains the workflow in more detail
• For transparency, share this MR with the audience that will be impacted.
  • Team: For changes that affect your direct team, share in your group Slack channel
  • Department: If the update affects your department, share the MR in your department Slack channel
  • Division: If the update affects your division, share the MR in your division Slack channel
  • Company: If the update affects all (or the majority of) GitLab team members, post an update in #whats-happening-at-gitlab linking to this MR
    • For high-priority company-wide announcements work with the internal communications team to post the update in #company-fyi and align on a plan to circulate in additional channels like the "While You Were Iterating" Newsletter

Commits

• Red Team Handbook rewrite

---

content/handbook/security/security-operations/red-team/how-we-operate/_index.md

@@ -5,35 +5,48 @@ no_list: true
 
 ## General operation guidelines
 
-Security breaches happen. We read about them every day. Most of our operations are not meant to prove this risk, as it is a well-accepted industry fact.
+We aim to safely and effectively conduct operations in order to emulate relevant adversaries to GitLab.
 
-### 1. Initial access vector or assumed breach
+- We work with the [Threat Intelligence team](../../threat-intelligence/) to identify the most relevant threats to emulate.
+- We conduct operations ethically and responsibly [without causing harm](rules-of-engagement.md/#general-safety-guidelines) to GitLab or its team members.
+- We maintain a **good trust relationship** with the rest of the Security division and the wider GitLab company.
 
-If relevant, we may conduct operations specifically looking for initial access vectors to exploit. These require substantial time and resources, so we ensure the investment is justified by the potential for security improvements and learning.
+It's important to us to intentionally and enthusiastically collaborate with the rest of the company, to balance out the semi-private, sometimes hidden nature of our work.
 
-Red Team members can also hunt for ways to "break in" to GitLab at any time in the context of an [Opportunistic Attack](../#opportunistic-attacks). This allows us to quickly remediate any discoveries. Successful intrusions can then be re-used in future stealth operations as proof of a realistic initial access vector.
+**Win together**: our goal is to improve security at GitLab, and that's the same goal our defensive teams have. We "win" when GitLab wins and security is improved - whether that's by us doing super 1337 hax or by SIRT stopping us in our tracks. We're not trying to establish "dominance" over defensive teams, we partner with them.
 
-[Club Red](../opportunistic-attacks/#club-red) allows team members to collaborate with us to develop an initial access idea they have.
+### 1. Initial access vector
 
-#### "Assumed Breach" first
+There are several ways we emulate initial access:
 
-Our Red Team operations can start from an "assumed breach" scenario where we gain initial access to GitLab's systems through a trusted insider. This is done in a realistic manner, leaving indicators of compromise ([IoCs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator_of_compromise)) that reflect an actual breach. From there, we focus on post-exploitation tactics and techniques such as establishing persistence and elevating privileges.
+- **Research**. We may conduct operations specifically looking for initial access vectors to exploit. These require substantial time and resources, so we ensure the investment is justified by the potential for security improvements and learning. For example, the [2024 Okta bypass](https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/red-team-tech-notes/okta-verify-bypass-sept-2024/) we researched and responsibly disclosed to Okta.
+- **Opportunistic**. Red Team members can also hunt for ways to "break in" to GitLab at any time in the context of an [Opportunistic Attack](../#opportunistic-attacks). This allows us to draw attention to any discoveries and GitLab can quickly remediate. Successful intrusions can then be re-used in future stealth operations as proof of a realistic initial access vector.
+- **Collaborative**. [Club Red](../opportunistic-attacks/#club-red) allows team members to collaborate with us to develop an initial access idea they have, and we can leverage their domain knowledge for a greater overall security result for GitLab.
+- **Assumed Breach**. Sometimes we create a scenario where we gain initial access to GitLab systems through a trusted insider. This is done in a realistic manner, leaving indicators of compromise ([IoCs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator_of_compromise)) that reflect an actual breach. From there, we focus on post-exploitation tactics and techniques such as establishing persistence and elevating privileges.
 
 ### 2. Operation execution
 
-All operations follow our [rules of engagement](rules-of-engagement.md).
+All operations follow our [rules of engagement](rules-of-engagement.md). We try to leave realistic indicators of compromise to simulate a realistic attack by the chosen emulated attacker.
 
 ### 3. Internal disclosure or discovery
 
 A given operation will continue until we are detected or until we disclose internally. Depending on what we find during an operation (for example, if we discover a significant security risk), we may disclose early to mitigate risk.
 
-After each operation, we meet with [Signals Engineering](../../signals-engineering/) and [Security Incident Response Team (SIRT)](../../sirt/) review our findings, attack steps and review detections and alerts.
+#### Social resolution
 
-If social engineering is involved, we follow a careful process to offer to meet with anyone who was involved in social engineering to ensure that they feel comfortable.
+Sometimes our operations involve attacking infrastructure set up by a certain team, socially engineering individual team members, or compromising a system due to misconfiguration set up by a team member.
+In any retrospective, we **always** aim to focus on improvements rather than assign blame.
+
+If social engineering is involved, we must be careful to ensure that the individuals involved in the exercise feel well supported and not blamed.
+We offer meet with anyone who was involved in social engineering to and thank them for being a part of our operation and to reassure them.
+
+We **never** want anyone to feel like they did something wrong, since our operations test **processes**, not individuals.
 
 ### 4. Report and recommendations for security improvements
 
-We then release a [report](#reporting) summarising the operation and our recommendations for improving security posture. We create issues using the [issue template](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/security-operations/redteam/redteam-public/resources/red-team-issue-templates), apply the relevant labels, and use this for tracking [metrics](#red-team-metrics).
+We then release a [report](#reporting) summarising the operation and our recommendations for improving security posture. We create issues using the [issue template](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/security-operations/redteam/redteam-public/resources/red-team-issue-templates), apply the relevant labels, and use this for tracking [metrics](#red-team-metrics). We then hand all our tools and techniques to the Blue Team so they can create relevant detections.
+
+We often work with [Signals Engineering](../../signals-engineering/) and [Security Incident Response Team (SIRT)](../../sirt/) to review our findings, attack steps and review detections and alerts.
 
 ### Reporting
 
@@ -43,7 +56,7 @@ Security risks affect everyone, and it is essential to make our reports approach
 
 There may also be a short (five minutes or less) video summary, if we feel it's needed.
 
-We will then share the following in `#whats-happening-at-gitlab` and cross-post it in `#security`:
+For stealth operations, or higher-visibility operations, it's beneficial to share the story with the entire company. In that case, we post the following the Slack channel `#whats-happening-at-gitlab` and cross-post it in `#security`:
 
 - A very short summary of the operation, including the video overview if there is one
 - A link to the final report
@@ -87,7 +100,7 @@ An outcome label is added to the issue within one week of delivering the recomme
 
 ### MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
 
-[MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org) is a framework for classifying and describing cyber attacks. We use ATT&CK extensively, as it helps us to align our operations to realistic threats and to speak a common language across security groups.
+[MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org) is a framework for classifying and describing cyber attacks. We use ATT&CK extensively, because it helps us to align our operations to realistic threats and to speak a common language across security groups.
 
 We use a combination of GitLab CI pipelines and GitLab Pages to build and host two reporting tools from MITRE:
 
@@ -104,3 +117,33 @@ For each completed operation, we build a flow chart to visualize the attack path
 That same ATT&CK Flow file is imported into our ATT&CK Navigator project, which generates a heatmap visualizing our coverage across the ATT&CK matrix. We maintain a single heatmap for each operation, as well as a combined heatmap for all previous operations.
 
 This is s great way to visualize the types of attack techniques we've emulated, and to help us understand areas we should focus on in future operations.
+
+## Is this the Red Team?
+
+### Why we don't answer this question
+
+The goal of a Red Team operation is often to test our policies and procedures when reacting to an actual threat. This includes identifying suspicious activity and following the appropriate runbook to investigate and respond to that threat.
+
+If any team member, at any time, could simply ask _"Hey, this looks suspicious. Is this our Red Team?"_ then this opportunity would be lost. **Instead, all suspicious activity should be treated as potentially malicious and acted upon accordingly**.
+
+We have private Slack channels in place where designated team members can ask the Red Team if a certain activity belongs to them. This helps us to provide realistic opportunities to practice detection and response without escalating too far. For example, we would not want an emulated attack to affect production operations or escalate to third parties.
+
+Managers at GitLab can also [submit a "Red Team Disclosure Request"](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/security-operations/redteam/redteam-internal/red-team-operations/-/issues/new?issuable_template=request-for-disclosure) at any time. If the request contains evidence related to an ongoing Red Team operation, we will discuss next steps in the Slack channels mentioned above.
+
+You can read more about this process in the ["Requests for Disclosure" section](rules-of-engagement#requests-for-disclosure) of our rules of engagement.
+
+### How the Red Team will respond to this question
+
+If the Red Team is ever asked _"Is this you?"_ by someone other than the designated team members mentioned above, they will respond with the following text:
+
+> Thanks for your vigilance! Any suspicious activity should be treated as potentially malicious. If you'd like to contact security, you can follow the process [here](../../sirt/engaging-security-on-call).
+>
+> Red Team operations provide an opportunity to practice detecting and responding to real-world attacks, and revealing an operation early might mean we miss out on that opportunity. Because of this, we have a policy to neither confirm nor deny whether an activity belongs to us. You can read more about this policy here: [{{< ref ".#is-this-the-red-team" >}}]({{< ref ".#is-this-the-red-team" >}}).
+
+### How others should respond to this question
+
+Because we want to treat all activity as potentially malicious, anyone else receiving this question should also use a consistent response. Feel free to use your own words. The following can be a guide:
+
+> We want to treat any suspicious activity as potentially malicious. Let's continue following our normal procedures to report and investigate this. Any Red Team operation will have controls in place to keep things from escalating too far. You can read more about this here: [{{< ref ".#is-this-the-red-team" >}}]({{< ref ".#is-this-the-red-team" >}}).
+
+If the person receiving this question happens to be a Security Director or a trusted participant in an ongoing stealth operation, they can then use established channels to communicate with the Red Team.