Interaction between CERTS and KEYS objects in a single sop run?

Should an instance of sop know enough to associate a revoked certificate with a different copy of the same certificate without the revocation?

Consider this sequence:

sop generate-key test > test.key
sop extract-cert < test.key > test.cert
sop revoke-key < test.key > test-revoked.cert
echo test | sop sign test.key > test.sig
echo test | sop verify test.sig test.cert test-revoked.cert

Should the final sop verify succeed or fail?

On the one hand, it is made by a known-revoked certificate. On the other hand, it is also a valid signature from a free-standing test.cert.

There are probably other interesting scenarios where a single cert shows up in multiple places in different forms on a sop invocation, and might have different consequences depending on whether the sop instance is clever enough to coalesce the data.

Do we want the specification to address this weird situation explicitly?