Commit 4223fbdb authored by sajolida's avatar sajolida

Move /install/download/openpgp into the new download page

Previously, the instructions for OpenPGP verification were in a separate
page because they implied a direct download and we didn't want to
advertise direct download for people who were not knowledgeable about
OpenPGP.

Now that direct download is advertised for everybody, we can move the
instructions here to make the life of our OpenPGP users easier.

It's at the bottom of the page and shouldn't hurt other users.

In this commit I'm also rescuing the translations we had from that page
but both the content and the translations will need some cleanup in the
next commits.
parent 91d9d51c
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[[!meta title="Download and verify using OpenPGP"]]
These instructions are for people who are already familiar with basic
usage of OpenPGP and have *GPG* installed but might need guidance on
performing the verification.
If you are not familiar with OpenPGP, download using either [[our
Firefox extension or BitTorrent|install/download]] instead.
1. Download the <a href='[[!inline pages="inc/stable_amd64_iso_url" raw="yes" sort="age"]]' class="use-mirror-pool">
Tails [[!inline pages="inc/stable_amd64_version" raw="yes" sort="age"]] ISO image</a>
(<span class="remove-extra-space">[[!inline pages="inc/stable_amd64_iso_size" raw="yes" sort="age"]]</span>).
1. Download the <a href='[[!inline pages="inc/stable_amd64_iso_sig_url" raw="yes" sort="age"]]'>
Tails [[!inline pages="inc/stable_amd64_version" raw="yes" sort="age"]] OpenPGP signature</a>
and save it to the same folder where
you saved the ISO image.
1. If you are doing the verification for the first time, download the
[[Tails signing key|tails-signing.key]] and import it in your keyring.
If you are working from Tails, the signing key is already included.
All our ISO images are signed with the same signing key, so you only
have to import it once. Still, you have to verify the ISO image every
time you download a new one.
<div class="tip">
<p>This download of the Tails signing key is protected using HTTPS.
But you could still download a malicious signing key if our website is
compromised or if you are victim of a [[man-in-the-middle
attack|doc/about/warning#man-in-the-middle]].</p>
<p>For additional verification, you can <a href="#wot">authenticate
the signing key through the OpenPGP Web of Trust</a>.</p>
</div>
Verify the ISO image
====================
This section provides simplified instructions:
- <a href="#windows">In Windows with <span class="application">Gpg4win</span></a>
- <a href="#mac">In macOS with <span class="application">GPGTools</span></a>
- <a href="#tails">In Tails</a>
- <a href="#command-line">Using the command line</span></a>
<div class="caution">
<p>As explained above in step 3, this simple OpenPGP verification
provides a level of verification equivalent to HTTPS, like the [[Firefox
extension or BitTorrent|install/download]], unless you also
<a href="#wot">authenticate the signing key through the OpenPGP Web of Trust</a>.</p>
</div>
<a id="windows"></a>
### In Windows with <span class="application">Gpg4win</span>
See the [[<span class="application">Gpg4win</span> documentation on
verifying signatures|http://www.gpg4win.org/doc/en/gpg4win-compendium_24.html#id4]].
Verify the date of the signature to make sure that you downloaded the latest version.
If the following warning appears:
<pre>
Not enough information to check the signature validity.
Signed on ... by tails@boum.org (Key ID: 0x58ACD84F
The validity of the signature cannot be verified.
</pre>
Then the ISO image is still correct according to the signing key that you
downloaded. To remove this warning you need to <a href="#wot">authenticate the
signing key through the OpenPGP Web of Trust</a>.
<a id="mac"></a>
### In macOS using <span class="application">GPGTools</span>
1. Open <span class="application">Finder</span> and navigate to the
folder where you saved the ISO image and the signature.
1. Right-click on the ISO image and choose
<span class="guimenuchoice">
<span class="guisubmenu">Services</span> ▸
<span class="guimenuitem">OpenPGP: Verify Signature of File</span></span>.
<a id="tails"></a>
### In Tails
1. Open the file browser and navigate to the folder where you saved the
ISO image and the signature.
1. Right-click on the signature and choose <span class="guimenuitem">Open With
Verify Signature</span>.
1. The verification of the ISO image starts automatically:
[[!img install/inc/screenshots/verifying_in_tails.png link="no"]]
1. After the verification finishes, click on the notification counter in
the bottom-right corner and on the notification with a transparent
background on the right of the notification area:
[[!img install/inc/screenshots/notification_in_tails.png link="no"]]
Verify the date of the signature to make sure that you downloaded the latest version.
<a id="command-line"></a>
### Using the command line
1. Open a terminal and navigate to the folder where you saved the ISO
image and the signature.
1. Execute:
<p class="pre">[[!inline pages="inc/stable_amd64_gpg_verify" raw="yes" sort="age"]]</p>
The output of this command should be the following:
<p class="pre">[[!inline pages="inc/stable_amd64_gpg_signature_output" raw="yes" sort="age"]]</p>
Verify the date of the signature to make sure that you downloaded the latest version.
If the output also includes:
<pre>
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.</pre>
Then the ISO image is still correct according to the signing key that you
downloaded. To remove this warning you need to <a href="#wot">authenticate
the signing key through the OpenPGP Web of Trust</a>.
<a id="wot"></a>
Authenticate the signing key through the OpenPGP Web of Trust
=============================================================
The verification techniques presented until now ([[Firefox extension,
BitTorrent|install/download]], or OpenPGP verification) all rely on some
information being securely downloaded using HTTPS from our website:
- The *checksum* for the Firefox extension
- The *Torrent file* for BitTorrent
- The *Tails signing key* for the OpenPGP verification
But, while doing so, you could download malicious information if our
website is compromised or if you are victim of a [[man-in-the-middle
attack|doc/about/warning#man-in-the-middle]].
The OpenPGP verification is the only technique that allows you to verify the ISO image even better
by also authenticating the Tails signing key through the OpenPGP Web of
Trust. Relying on the OpenPGP Web of Trust is the only way to completely
protect you from malicious downloads.
<div class="note">
<p>If you are verifying an ISO image from inside Tails already, for
example to do a manual upgrade, then the Tails signing key is already
included in Tails. You can trust this signing key as much as you are trusting your
Tails installation already because you are not downloading it.</p>
</div>
One of the inherent problems of standard HTTPS is that the trust we usually put
in a website is defined by certificate authorities: a hierarchical and closed
set of companies and governmental institutions approved by your web browser vendor.
This model of trust has long been criticized and proved several times to be
vulnerable to attacks [[as explained on our warning page|doc/about/warning#man-in-the-middle]].
We believe that, instead, users should be given the final say when trusting a
website, and that designation of trust should be done on the basis of human
interactions.
The OpenPGP [[!wikipedia Web_of_Trust]] is a
decentralized trust model based on OpenPGP keys that can help solving
this problem. Let's see this with an example:
1. *You are friend with Alice and really trust her way of managing
OpenPGP keys. So you are trusting Alice's key.*
1. *Furthermore, Alice met Bob, a Tails developer, in a conference and certified
Bob's key. So Alice is trusting Bob's key.*
1. *Bob is a Tails developer who directly owns the Tails signing key. So
Bob fully trusts the Tails signing key.*
In this scenario, Alice found a path to trust the Tails signing key
without the need to rely on certificate authorities.
<div class="tip">
<p>If you are on Debian, Ubuntu, or Linux Mint, you can install the
<code>debian-keyring</code> package which contains the OpenPGP keys of
all Debian developers. Some Debian developers have certified the Tails
signing key and you can use these certifications to build a trust path.
This technique is explained in detail in our instructions on
[[installing Tails from Debian, Ubuntu, or Linux Mint using the command
line|install/expert/usb]].</p>
</div>
Relying on the Web of Trust requires both caution and intelligent supervision
by the users. The technical details are outside of the scope of this document.
Since the Web of Trust is actually based on human relationships and
real-life interactions, the best is to get in touch with people
knowledgeable about OpenPGP and build trust relationships in order to
find your own trust path to the Tails signing key.
For example, you can start by contacting a local [[!wikipedia Linux_User_Group]],
[[an organization offering Tails training|support/learn]], or other Tails
enthusiasts near you and exchange about their OpenPGP practices.
<div class="tip">
<p>After you built a trust path, you can certify the Tails signing key by
signing it with your own key to get rid of some warnings during the
verification process.</p>
</div>
# Further reading on OpenPGP
- [[!wikipedia GnuPG desc="Wikipedia: %s"]], a free OpenPGP software
- [[Apache: How To OpenPGP|http://www.apache.org/dev/openpgp.html]]
- [[Debian: Keysigning|http://www.debian.org/events/keysigning]], a
tutorial on signing keys of other people
- [[rubin.ch: Explanation of the web of trust of PGP|http://www.rubin.ch/pgp/weboftrust.en.html]]
- [[Gpg4win: Certificate
inspection|http://www.gpg4win.org/doc/en/gpg4win-compendium_16.html]],
instructions to manage key trust with Gpg4win
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