Commit 0c345519 authored by xin's avatar xin

Update links

parent 22918016
......@@ -117,17 +117,17 @@ msgstr "[[!img htw2-tails.png link=no alt=\"Eine Tor-Verbindung geht üblicherwe
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The last relay on this circuit, called the exit node, is the one that establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on "
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"communications?](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
msgstr ""
"Das letzte Relais einer solchen Verbindung, das Ausgangsrelais, stellt die eigentliche Verbindung zu dem Zielserver her. Da Tor die Daten zwischen Ausgangsrelais und Zielserver nicht verschlüsselt und konzeptionell nicht verschlüsseln kann, **kann jedes Ausgangsrelais jeden beliebigen durch ihn hindurch geleiteten Datenverkehr aufzeichnen**. Siehe [Tor FAQ: Can "
"exit nodes eavesdrop on communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"exit nodes eavesdrop on communications?](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For example, in 2007, a security researcher intercepted thousands of private e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was running. See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/"
"For example, in 2007, a security researcher intercepted thousands of private e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was running. See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/"
"embassy_hacks)."
msgstr ""
"Beispielsweise hat ein Sicherheitsforscher im Jahr 2007 weltweit tausende private E-Mails zwischen ausländischen Botschaften und Menschenrechtsgruppen abgehört, indem er die aus von ihm betriebenen Ausgangsrelais ausgehenden Verbindungen überwacht hat. Siehe [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise](http://www.wired.com/politics/"
"Beispielsweise hat ein Sicherheitsforscher im Jahr 2007 weltweit tausende private E-Mails zwischen ausländischen Botschaften und Menschenrechtsgruppen abgehört, indem er die aus von ihm betriebenen Ausgangsrelais ausgehenden Verbindungen überwacht hat. Siehe [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/"
"security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ msgid "<!-- Source: wiki/lib/man-in-the-middle.svg -->\n"
msgstr "<!-- Source: wiki/lib/man-in-the-middle.svg -->\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid "While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a man-in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
msgstr "Bei der Verwendung von Tor sind Man-in-the-Middle-Angriffe immer noch zwischen Ausgangsrelais und Zielserver möglich. Zudem kann das Ausgangsrelais selbst als Mittelsmann agieren. Für ein Beispiel eines solchen Angriffs, siehe [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
msgid "While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a man-in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
msgstr "Bei der Verwendung von Tor sind Man-in-the-Middle-Angriffe immer noch zwischen Ausgangsrelais und Zielserver möglich. Zudem kann das Ausgangsrelais selbst als Mittelsmann agieren. Für ein Beispiel eines solchen Angriffs, siehe [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
......@@ -270,10 +270,10 @@ msgstr "Allerdings kommt noch hinzu, dass das Vertrauensmodell mit Zertifizierun
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For example, on March 15, 2011, Comodo, one of the major SSL certificates authorities, reported that a user account with an affiliate registration authority had been compromised. It was then used to create a new user account that issued nine certificate signing requests for seven domains: mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (three "
"certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee. See [Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
"certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee. See [Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](https://blog.comodo.com/other/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
msgstr ""
"Beispielsweise berichtete Comodo, eine der größten SSL-Zertifikat-Autoritäten, am 15. März 2011, dass ein Benutzungskonto mit Rechten einer Registrierungsstelle kompromittiert worden sei. Diese wurde anschließend zum Anlegen eines neuen Benutzungskontos verwendet, welches neun Signierungsanfragen für Zertifikate von sieben Domains ausgestellt hat: mail.google."
"com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (drei Zertifikate), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, und global trustee. Siehe [Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
"com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (drei Zertifikate), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, und global trustee. Siehe [Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](https://blog.comodo.com/other/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
......@@ -305,14 +305,14 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
msgstr ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Zitiert aus [[!wikipedia_de Man-in-the-Middle-Angriff\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] und <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] und <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
......
......@@ -172,16 +172,15 @@ msgid ""
"not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic "
"passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on "
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/"
"TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"communications?](https://www.torproject.org/docs/"
"faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
msgstr ""
"آخرین رله در این مدار گره خروجی نام دارد و نقطه‌ای است که ارتباط اصلی به سرور "
"مقصد را ایجاد می‌کند. از آن‌جا که تور ترافیک بین یک گره خروجی و سرور مقصد را "
"رمزگذاری نمی‌کند و بنا به طراحی‌اش نباید هم چنین کاری بکند، **هر گره خروجی "
"امکان دسترسی به هر ترافیکی که از آن می‌گذرد را دارد**. رجوع کنید به [سوالات "
"متداول تور: آیا گره‌های خروجی می‌توانند ارتباطات را شنود کنند؟](https://trac."
"torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/"
"TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"متداول تور: آیا گره‌های خروجی می‌توانند ارتباطات را شنود کنند؟](https://www."
"torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
......@@ -189,12 +188,12 @@ msgid ""
"e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the "
"world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was "
"running. See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's "
"Paradise](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
"Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
msgstr ""
"برای نمونه در سال ۲۰۰۷ یک پژوهش‌گر امنیتی به هزاران رایانامهٔ خصوصی ارسال‌شده "
"از سوی سفارت‌خانه‌های خارجی و گروه‌های حقوق بشری در دنیا را با جاسوسی روی "
"ارتباطات خارج‌شده از یک گره خروجی که در اختیارش بود دسترسی پیدا کرد. رجوع "
"کنید به [وایرد: گره‌های یاغی تور را تبدیل به بهشت جاسوسان می‌کنند](http://www."
"کنید به [وایرد: گره‌های یاغی تور را تبدیل به بهشت جاسوسان می‌کنند](http://archive."
"wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)"
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -311,14 +310,14 @@ msgid ""
"While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit "
"node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a man-"
"in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node "
"doing MITM attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-"
"node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
"doing MITM attacks](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www."
"teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
msgstr ""
"هنگام استفاده از تور همچنان ممکن است حملات فرد میانی بین گره خروجی و سرور "
"مقصد رخ دهند. گره خروجی نیز می‌تواند خود را فرد میانی جا بزند. برای مشاهدهٔ "
"نمونهٔ چنین حمله‌ای رجوع کنید به [وبلاگ ام‌دابلیو: حملات فرد میانی از سوی "
"گره‌های خروجی تور](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-"
"node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
"گره‌های خروجی تور](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www."
"teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
......@@ -461,14 +460,14 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
msgstr ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">برگرفته از [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]]، [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] و <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] و <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">پروژهٔ تور: یافتن\n"
"هک‌های گواهی‌های دیجیتال و \n"
"همدستی‌های مرورگرهای وب</a>.</p>\n"
......
......@@ -173,17 +173,16 @@ msgid ""
"not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic "
"passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on "
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/"
"TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"communications?](https://www.torproject.org/docs/"
"faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
msgstr ""
"Le dernier relais sur ce circuit, appelé nœud de sortie, est celui qui "
"établit la connexion au serveur de la destination. Comme Tor ne chiffre pas, "
"et ne peut pas le faire de toute façon, ce qui transite entre le nœud de "
"sortie et le serveur de la destination, **tout nœud de sortie a la "
"possibilité de capturer le trafic qui passe par lui**. Voir [Tor FAQ: Can "
"exit nodes eavesdrop on communications? (en anglais)](https://trac."
"torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/"
"TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"exit nodes eavesdrop on communications? (en anglais)](https://www."
"torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
......@@ -191,13 +190,13 @@ msgid ""
"e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the "
"world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was "
"running. See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's "
"Paradise](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
"Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
msgstr ""
"Par exemple, en 2007, un chercheur en sécurité informatique a intercepté des "
"milliers d'e-mails privés envoyés par des ambassades étrangères et des ONG à "
"travers le monde en écoutant le trafic sortant du nœud de sortie qu'il "
"faisait fonctionner. Voir [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into "
"Eavesdropper's Paradise (en anglais)](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/"
"Eavesdropper's Paradise (en anglais)](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/"
"news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -313,14 +312,14 @@ msgid ""
"While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit "
"node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a man-"
"in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node "
"doing MITM attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-"
"node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
"doing MITM attacks](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www."
"teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
msgstr ""
"En utilisant Tor, une attaque de l'homme-du-milieu peut toujours arriver "
"entre le nœud de sortie et le serveur destinataire. Le nœud de sortie peut "
"également agir comme un homme-du-milieu. Pour l'exemple d'une telle attaque "
"voir (en anglais) [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](http://www."
"teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
"voir (en anglais) [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](https://web."
"archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
......@@ -373,8 +372,8 @@ msgid ""
"account that issued nine certificate signing requests for seven domains: "
"mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (three "
"certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee. See "
"[Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-"
"security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
"[Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](https://blog.comodo.com/other/the-recent-"
"ra-compromise/)."
msgstr ""
"Par exemple, le 15 Mars 2011, Comodo, une entreprise de délivrance de "
"certificat SSL parmi les plus importantes, annonça qu'un compte utilisateur "
......@@ -382,8 +381,7 @@ msgstr ""
"pour générer neuf certificats pour sept noms de domaines : mail.google.com, "
"login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (3 certificats), login.skype."
"com, addons.mozilla.org, et global trustee. Voir (en anglais) [Comodo: The "
"Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-"
"recent-ra-compromise/)."
"Recent RA Compromise](https://blog.comodo.com/other/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
......@@ -435,14 +433,14 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
msgstr ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Sources [[!wikipedia_fr Attaque_de_l'homme_du_milieu\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] et <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] et <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
......
......@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does not,
and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the
destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic
passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on
communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad).
communications?](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop).
For example, in 2007, a security researcher intercepted thousands of private
e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the
world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was running.
See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's
Paradise](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks).
Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks).
**To protect yourself from such attacks you should use end-to-end encryption.**
......@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit
node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a
man-in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node
doing MITM
attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks).
attacks](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks).
**Again, to protect yourself from such attacks you should use end-to-end
encryption** and while doing so taking extra care at verifying the server
......@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ to create a new user account that issued nine certificate signing requests for
seven domains: mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com
(three certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee.
See [Comodo: The Recent RA
Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-recent-ra-compromise/).
Compromise](https://blog.comodo.com/other/the-recent-ra-compromise/).
Later in 2011, DigiNotar, a Dutch SSL certificate company, incorrectly issued
certificates to a malicious party or parties. Later on, it came to light that
......@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ who happen to use Tor.
<p class="quoted-from">Quoted from [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack
desc="Wikipedia: %s"]], [[!wikipedia
Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc="Wikipedia: %s"]] and <a
Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc="Wikipedia: %s"]] and <a
href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion">Tor
Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser
collusion</a>.</p>
......
......@@ -162,17 +162,16 @@ msgid ""
"not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic "
"passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on "
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/"
"TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"communications?](https://www.torproject.org/docs/"
"faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
msgstr ""
"O último relay desse circuito, chamado de nó de saída, é aquele que "
"estabelece a conexão com o servidor de destino. Como o Tor não criptografa o "
"tráfego entre um nó de saída e o servidor de destino (e nem poderia por "
"questões de projeto), **qualquer nó de saída está numa posição na qual pode "
"capturar qualquer tráfego passando por ele**. Veja a página de [FAQ do Tor: "
"nós de saída podem bisbilhotar comunicações?](https://trac.torproject.org/"
"projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/"
"TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"nós de saída podem bisbilhotar comunicações?](https://www.torproject.org/"
"docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop)."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
......@@ -180,13 +179,13 @@ msgid ""
"e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the "
"world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was "
"running. See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's "
"Paradise](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
"Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
msgstr ""
"Por exemplo, em 2007 um pesquisador de segurança interceptou milhares de "
"mensagens de e-mail enviadas por embaixadas estrangeiras e grupos de "
"direitos humanos ao redor do mundo através da espionagem das conexões que "
"saíam de um nó de saída que ele estava rodando. Leia [Wired: Rogue Nodes "
"Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise](http://www.wired.com/"
"Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/"
"politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks) (english)."
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -303,15 +302,15 @@ msgid ""
"While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit "
"node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a man-"
"in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node "
"doing MITM attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-"
"node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
"doing MITM attacks](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www."
"teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
msgstr ""
"Enquanto o Tor está em uso, ataques man-in-the-middle ainda podem ocorrer "
"entre o nó de saída e o servidor de destino. O nó de saída propriamente dito "
"também pode atuar como um homem-no-meio. Para um exemplo desse tipo de "
"ataque, veja [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](http://www."
"teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks) (em "
"inglês)."
"ataque, veja [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node doing MITM attacks](https://web."
"archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/"
"tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks) (em inglês)."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
......@@ -457,14 +456,14 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
msgstr ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Citado de [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] e <a\n"
"Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] e <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a> (em inglês).</p>\n"
......
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